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An International-Comparative Perspective
on Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing and Third
Party Liability in Copyright Law: Framing
the Past, Present, and Next Generations'
Questions
Guy Pessach*
ABSTRACT

In the last decade, the phenomenon of peer-to-peer filesharing and its various legal aspects have been dealt with
extensively by legal scholarship. The purpose of this Article is to
take a closer inspection of several particular legal aspects that
are related to peer-to-peer file-sharing as a comparative, social,
economic, and cultural phenomenon. The Article begins by
providing critical comparative analysis of distinct paradigms
that different legal systems have offered regarding the question
of third party liability for copyright infringements that occur
through peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms. The Article then
presents three focal policy considerations that should serve as
copyright law's compass in the context of peer-to-peer filesharing. (a) adopting a requirement of compliance between the
legal liability of third parties and copyright law's exemptions
and limitations regime; (b) striking a socially desired allocation
of risk between positive and negative externalities that peer-topeer file-sharing platforms tend to generate; (c) understanding
the unique distributional concerns that are raised by legal
regulationof peer-to-peer file-sharingplatforms, especially when
taking into account the nature of such platforms as a novel
emerging speech resource that society has to decide upon its
allocation. The last part of the Article focuses on some of the
next generation legal questions that peer-to-peer networks are
already beginning to give rise to, including the legal liability of
internet service providers for managing peer-to-peer traffic
through active caching and routing applications.
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I. INTRODUCTION

After a long wait, the phenomenon of peer-to-peer file-sharing
has recently been addressed by a number of high courts around the
globe: the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc v. Grokster Ltd.;' the federal court of Australia's decision
in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings

1.
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). Prior judicial decisions in the United States
regarding the legality of peer-to-peer file-sharing software and platforms include
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004); In
re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). This Article is not intended to provide a
comprehensive and detailed survey of the various legal aspects or judicial decisions
that are related to the phenomenon of peer-to-peer file-sharing. That is an issue that
has already been dealt with by extensive legal writing in the last few years. Rather, the
Author's purpose is to highlight comparative legal aspects of peer-to-peer file-sharing,
which thus far have been relatively ignored, and to add some novel perspectives on the
law's desired approach regarding the operation of peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms.
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Ltd.;2 and two Canadian decisions, one of which is a decision of the
Canadian Supreme Court that also includes several important
statements with implications on the legality of file-sharing activities
3
and the scope of third party liability in such circumstances.
The purpose of this Article is twofold. The Article begins by
providing a critical comparative analysis of these decisions and the
distinct paradigms that different legal systems have offered regarding
the question of third party liability for copyright infringements that
occur through peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms. The Article then
turns to develop several novel insights regarding the policy
considerations that should serve as copyright law's compass in the
context of peer-to-peer file-sharing and, more specifically, in the
context of some of the next generation of legal questions that peer-topeer platforms are already beginning to give rise to.
Parts II and III include an overall critical examination of recent
judicial developments regarding third party liability for copyright
infringements that take place through peer-to-peer file-sharing
platforms. Part IV then presents and develops the Author's argument
for a requirement of compliance between legal regimes of third party
liability and copyright law's exemptions. The discussion begins by
demonstrating the implications of different legal regimes of third
party liability on the extent and degree that copyright law's
exemptions and limitations could be effectively utilized. It continues
by establishing a normative argument according to which any legal
framework of third party liability must be shaped and adjusted in a
manner that takes into account its implications on the vitality of
copyright law's exemptions and limitations.
Parts V and VI offer two novel perspectives on peer-to-peer filesharing platforms and the implications that different regimes of third
party liability might have on society's communicative and
technological environment.
The first perspective highlights the
potential influence that different regimes of third party liability
might have on the allocation of risk between positive and negative
externalities that peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms tend to generate.
After focusing on positive spillovers that peer-to-peer platforms
produce and the risks that broad third party liability imposes on such
spillovers, the Article presents several considerations in support of a
legal regime that places a higher degree of risk on the proprietary
interests of copyright owners.
The second perspective develops the notion of peer-to-peer filesharing platforms as a new evolving speech resource that society has
to decide upon its allocation. It begins by developing the concept of

2.
(2005) 220 A.L.R. 1.
3.
Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Can. Ass'n. of
Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427; BMG Can., Inc. v. Doe, [2004] F.C. 241, appeal
filed, [2005] F.C. 81.
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speech resources and the unique distributional concerns that the
allocation of legal entitlements in speech resources give rise to. The
general observations regarding the allocation of entitlements in
speech resources are then applied in the context of peer-to-peer fileprototype
sharing platforms, which are-it shall be argued-a
example for a new emerging speech resource.
As the Author will argue, both perspectives have direct
implications on law's approach toward third party liability for
copyright infringements that occur through peer-to-peer file-sharing
platforms. The overall purpose in these two parts is twofold: first, to
locate the question of third party liability for copyright infringement
within a broader framework of policy considerations that are conjured
up with the emergence of innovative technological devices and novel
communication platforms. The second is to evaluate current legal
approaches toward third party liability under this broader framework
of policy considerations.
Part VII concludes by examining some of the next generation of
questions of peer-to-peer platforms through the prism of the
preceding discussion. The focus of examination will be the legal
liability of internet service providers (ISPs) that use active caching
and routing applications for managing efficiently peer-to-peer
traffic-an issue that thus far has not been dealt with explicitly
either by legislators or by courts. Based on policy considerations that
were previously developed, this Article shall present an argument in
support of limiting the liability of internet service providers that use
active caching and routing applications, even if such applications
involve reproduction and copying of files that are exchanged through
peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms.

II. THE METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER AND UNIVERSAL MUSIC AUSTRALIA
DECISIONS

Both the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
and the Australian federal court's decision in Universal Music
Australia have dealt with similar file-sharing software that allows
computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer
networks. In both decisions, the courts ruled that actions taken by the
producers of the file-sharing software might justify the imposition of
third party liability for copyright infringement. 4 Each decision,
however, established its holding on a different argument, different
factual merits, and a different standard of liability.

4.

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 125 S. Ct. at 2770; Universal Music Austl., 220

A.L.R. at 116-17.
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In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the U.S. Supreme Court developed a
theory of inducement for imposing secondary liability on third parties
that produce and distribute devices capable of both infringing and
non-infringing uses. According to the Court's decision, if a third party
distributes such devices with the object of promoting copyright
infringements, or if one takes other affirmative steps to foster
copyright infringements, then this third party would be liable for acts
of infringements by primary users of the devices, regardless of the
fact that the device is also capable of lawful uses. 5
The Court's inclination to consider the imposition of liability on
third parties was, however, narrowly constructed as an additional
layer on top of the already well-established components of secondary
liability in U.S. copyright law (contributory liability and vicarious
liability).6 The Court specifically emphasized the fact that nothing in
its ruling overturned the judgment of Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 7 which held that when a product is
capable of substantial, non-infringing use its mere production and
distribution do not impose secondary liability for third parties'
infringing uses of it. 8 Overall, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer is a bounded
precedent for imposing secondary liability on third parties that are
involved in the production and distribution of devices and platforms
for peer-to-peer file-sharing. The imposition of such liability would
require direct evidence of actions promoting the use of the software

5.
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 125 S. Ct. at 2779-80.
6.
U.S. copyright law recognizes two basic forms of secondary liability:
contributory infringement and vicarious infringement. Though the distinction between
these two forms of secondary liability has not always been clear, the elements
necessary for a finding of contributory infringement are generally considered to be: (1)
direct infringement by a primary infringer, (2) knowledge of the infringement, and (3)
material contribution to the infringement. The elements of vicarious infringement are:
(1) direct infringement by a primary party, (2) a direct financial benefit to the
defendant, and (3) the right and ability to supervise the infringers. In both cases, the
element of direct infringement by a primary party is essential. With regard to
vicarious infringement, direct financial benefit is also undisputed. For an elaboration
of these two forms of secondary liability in U.S. copyright law, see A &M Records, Inc.,
239 F.3d at 1019-24.
7.
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
8.
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 125 S. Ct. at 2782. There were two concurring
opinions in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. The first was written by Justice Ginsburg and
joined by Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy, and the second was written by Justice
Breyer and joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor. The two concurring opinions
diverged on the interpretation of the Sony decision's applicability in circumstances
where evidence was shown that a device's central and prominent use was for activities
that constitute copyright infringement. According to Justice Ginsburg's concurring
opinion, in such circumstances secondary liability should be imposed even where no
evidence for promoting the use of the device for copyright infringement was shown. Id.
at 2783-84. To the contrary, Justice Breyer's opinion stated that according to the Sony
decision, even the distribution of a product that is used almost exclusively for
infringing uses would not in itself impose secondary liability, as long as the device is
capable of non-infringing uses. Id. at 2787.
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for copyright infringement. Although such evidences did exist in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, one could speculate that in the future,
producers and distributors of file-sharing software would be very
cautious before taking any action or expression that relates the
software with copyright infringement.
In Universal Music Australia, the federal court of Australia took
a different path regarding the imposition of secondary liability on
producers of file-sharing software. 9 The court's ruling relied on
Sections 101(1) and 101(1A) of the Australian Copyright Act, 1968.
Section 101(1) imposes secondary liability of copyright infringement
on someone who "authorizes" "the doing in Australia of, any act
comprised in the copyright." 10 Section 101(1A), as added to the
copyright act in 2000, adds that:
In determining, for the purposes of subsection (1), whether or not a
person has authorized the doing in Australia of any act comprised in a
copyright subsisting by virtue of this Part without the license of the
owner of the copyright, the matters that must be taken into account
include the following: (a) the extent (if any) of the person's power to
prevent the doing of the act concerned; (b) the nature of any
relationship existing between the person and the person who did the
act concerned; (c) whether the person took any other reasonable steps to
prevent or avoid the doing of the act, including whether the person
11
complied with any relevant industry codes of practice.

Based on these two Sections, the court found several "reasonable
steps" that the defendants could have taken to significantly decrease
the use of the file-sharing software for copyright infringements,
including non-optional keyword and metadata filtering, which would
prevent the display of search results with files whose particulars
(title, artist, etc.) matched particulars of copyrighted sound
recordings (such as those listed in the catalogues of record
companies).12

In addition, the court rejected the defendants' attempt to use the
safe-harbor of Section 112E of the Australian Copyright Act, which
states that:
A person (including a carrier or carriage service provider) who provides
facilities for making, or facilitating the making of, a communication is
not taken to have authorized any infringement of copyright in an audiovisual item merely because another person uses the facilities so

9.
It should be noted that the court's decision also mentioned and gave weight
to several "inducement actions" for copyright infringement that were taken by the
defendants. See Universal Music Austl., 220 A.L.R. at 405. Nevertheless, as opposed
to the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer decision in the United States, this was only one of several
elements and convictions in the court's reasoning. Id. at 98.
10.
Copyright Act, 1968, § 101(1) (Austl.).
11.
Id. § 101(1A).
Universal Music Austl., 220 A.L.R. at 36.
12.
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provided to do something the right to do which is included in the
13
copyright.

In the court's view, Section 112E did not confer general immunity
against a finding of authorization, and even a person who falls within
the definitions of Section 112E may be held, for other reasons, to be
14
an "authorizer" under Section 101(1A).
Overall, Universal Music Australia represents an approach that
is much more activist than the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. The Australian court adopted an approach
imposing upon manufacturers and distributors of peer-to-peer filesharing software a duty of care to adopt standards and mechanisms
for the prevention of copyright infringement. 15 The court's
interpretation of Section 101(1A) and Section 112E of the Australian
Copyright Act implemented a negligence-type rule that holds third
parties liable for their failure to take steps that are economically
reasonable precautions to prevent the harm of copyright
infringements. 16 Indeed, the bedrock of Section 101(1A)'s explicit
language made it relatively easy for the Australian court in choosing
this path.
Nevertheless, as a common law, judge-made doctrine, the U.S.
doctrine of secondary liability also has the potential of being shaped
under a negligence-type rule and not only according to factors such as
knowledge, control, the extent of non-infringing uses, and actions of
inducement. 17 Yet the U.S. Supreme Court has chosen the latter
option, and it seems that it is not just the formal absence of specific
presumptions of "authorization," such as those of Section 101(1A) of
the Australian Copyright Act, that have led the U.S. Court to
construct a different understanding what third party liability stands
for in the context of peer-to-peer file-sharing. In addition, the U.S.
approach also seems to rely on a different legacy, one that
significantly weighs the side effects of secondary liability, including:
(1) the fear that copyright owners would gain control over new and
still developing technologies 1 8 and (2) the chilling effect that the

13.
Copyright Act, 1968, § 112E (Austl.).
14.
Id.
15.
Universal Music Austl., 220 A.L.R. at 99.
16.
For an economic argument regarding the influence that negligence-type
rules should have on the construction of secondary liability in copyright law, see
generally William Landes & Douglas Lichtman, Indirect Liability for Copyright
Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARv. J.L. & TECH 395 (2003).
17.
See supra note 6; see also Landes & Lichtman, supra note 16, at 405.
Moreover, among the rights granted to copyright owners within the U.S. Copyright Act
is the exclusive right to authorize others to exercise the various other rights that arise
under the grant of copyright. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). Hence, there is
also a legislative anchor (though maybe unintentional) to rely on when attempting to
establish a standard of negligence for secondary liability of copyright infringement.
18.
See generally Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of
DigitalDistribution,47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423 (2002).

94

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40:87

imposition of liability on third parties might have on non-infringing
activities that rely on and use the same devices. 19
The following Parts will elaborate on these considerations, but
the main point for the current comparison between the two decisions
is the following: once taking into account the above-mentioned
considerations, a negligence rule that seeks to impose liability on the
party that would be most efficient in preventing copyright
infringements (as well as in spreading the costs of avoiding the
negative externalities of a pending activity) is no longer a conclusive
rule.20 It still remains an open question, however, whether in the long
run, a negligence-type rule, such as the one that was adopted in
Section 101(1A) of the Australian Copyright Act and applied in
Universal Music Australia would be interpreted in a manner that
takes into account and internalizes the same considerations that have
guided the U.S. Supreme Court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer.
At the practical level, the differences between the two decisions
are significant. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer virtually shields producers and
distributors of file-sharing software from secondary liability unless
copyright owners bear the burden of providing evidence on actions of
inducement to copyright infringements that were taken by third
parties. On the other hand, the negligence standard of Universal
Music Australia has far-reaching potential implications for third
party liability. One cannot ignore the possibility that the court's
interpretation of Section 101(1A) would be likewise applicable to
internet service providers, who have the capabilities of taking
reasonable steps to either prevent or avoid copyright infringements
that peer-to-peer file-sharing activity involve.
The filtering and screening mechanisms that the Australian
federal court had practically obliged producers of file-sharing
software to implement in order to avoid legal liability are likewise
affected and are operated by internet service providers. Hence, unless
an internet service provider could shelter under a specific statutory
safe-harbor that would exempt it from secondary liability, according
to Universal Music Australia there are potential risks of secondary
legal liability. As for the mere transmission of materials through a
network controlled or operated by an internet service provider, the
current safe-harbors of Section 512(a) of the American Digital
Millennium Act 2 ' and Articles 12 and 15 of the European Directive on

19.
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct.
2764, 2792-96 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring).
20.
The basic presumption in this context is that the imposition of secondary
liability on a central intermediary, such as the producer of file-sharing software, saves
enforcement costs of suing a large number of end-users who are conducting the primary
infringement activity. Likewise, such a step enables internalization of the costs of
infringement through the intermediary, either by preventing the infringing activity or
by channeling it to legally licensed activities.
21.
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 103, 1201 (2000).
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Electronic Commerce 22 seem to provide such a shelter. Nevertheless,
as will be further explained in Part VII infra, it is an open question
whether current safe-harbors would be applicable in the context of
peer-to-peer traffic management solutions, such as active caching and
routing applications, that are already being used by some internet
service providers in order to utilize bandwidth consumption and
23
manage efficiently peer-to-peer traffic.

III. THE PRIMARY LIABILITY OF END-USERS, STATUTORY LICENSEES,
AND LEVY SCHEMES

A. The Primary Liability of End-Users
Despite the differences between the two decisions, one thing
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and Universal Music Australia have in
common is the somewhat far-reaching assumption regarding the
primary liability of end-users who employ peer-to-peer file-sharing
software to download copyrighted materials. A prerequisite for
imposing secondary liability is a direct infringement by a primary
infringer. In analyzing secondary liability, both decisions presumed
that overall the use of file-sharing software by end-users for the

22.
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 8
June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular
Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter
Electronic Commerce Directive].
23.
At this stage, it is worth emphasizing the narrow interpretation that the
Australian federal court in Universal Music Australia gave to the safe-harbor of
Section 112E. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14. As already mentioned, this
Section states that the mere provision of facilities for making, or facilitating the
making of, a communication, which has been used for copyright infringement, should
not be taken as an "authorization" for copyright infringement. Id. With regard to this
Section, the court had explicitly stated that even if the mere provision of such facilities
should not be counted as "authorization," other actions that are taken by the same
person, who falls within Section 112E, might still impose on him liability as an
"authorizer" according to Section 101(1A). Id. This approach of the Australian court is
another reason why the decision in Universal Music Australia might shuffle some of
the parameters regarding liability of internet service providers for peer-to-peer filesharing activity; at least when it is proven that by taking reasonable steps, such as
filtering and screening techniques, the internet service provider could have blocked
unauthorized transmission of copyrighted files. One major problem of such an
approach is the chilling effect that it might impose on internet service providers: in
order to avoid the risk of legal liability, internet service providers will tend to use
filtering and screening techniques that over protect the system and thus have a sideeffect of blocking non-infringing materials as well. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright
Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against
Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345,
399-410 (1995). This point will again be addressed in infra Part V, discussing the
influence of different third party liability regimes on the allocation of risk between
positive and negative externalities.

96

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40..87

purpose of downloading copyrighted materials should be regarded as
a primary infringement of copyright.2 4 Neither Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
nor Universal Music Australia include any attempt to distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate downloads 25of copyrighted
materials through peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms.
As for the Australian case, this approach might be explained by
the fact that the Australian Copyright Act has no general exemption
very limited
with regard to private copying, except Section ll's
exemption regarding direct recording of television and radio
broadcasts for the purpose of time-shifting. 26 Likewise, the
Australian fair dealing defense, in Sections 103A-103C of the
Australian Copyright Act, is limited only to the purposes of "criticism
or review," "reporting news," and "research or study" 27-a fact that
also narrows the potential scope of legitimate downloads of
copyrighted materials through peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms. As
for the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, however, the above-mentioned
approach is a little more surprising when one takes into account the
legacy of the Sony decision.
As already mentioned, 28 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer relied extensively
on the ruling in Sony while emphasizing that the newly introduced
inducement theory served as an additional top layer that followed
and adhered to the contours of the Sony decision. 29 Yet the MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Court gave no weight or reference to the fact that in
Sony, the use of home-video tapes by end-users for purposes of
recording copyrighted works was classified as legitimate fair use
30
under Section 107 of the Federal Copyright Act.
Indeed, this aspect of the majority's opinion in Sony has been
criticized, and moreover, lower courts that have dealt with primary
liability of end-users for unauthorized file-sharing of copyrighted
materials have also rejected the argument that such an activity is
protected under the fair use exemption. 31 Yet given the Sony
precedent, the Supreme Court's approach in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
regarding this matter raises some doubts. A discussion regarding the
interface fair use file-sharing platforms is entirely absent from the
Court's decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. Hence, one cannot ignore

24.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 125 S. Ct. at 2778; Universal Music Austl. Pty Ltd.
v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (2005) 220 A.L.R. 1, 97-101.
25.
See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 125 S. Ct. 2764; Universal Music
Austl., 220 A.L.R. 1.
Copyright Act, 1968, § 111 (Austl.).
26.
Id. §§ 103A-103C.
27.
28.
See supra note 8.
29.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 125 S. Ct. at 2782.
30.
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447456 (1984).
31.
See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001).
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the implicit assumption of the Court that for the purposes of
analyzing third party liability, all private copying of copyrighted
works by people who use file-sharing software cannot be classified as
fair use. Such an assumption seems misguided for several reasons.
Once going down the chain of liability and focusing on primary
liability of end-users, each particular case of an end-user must be
examined according to its unique merits, including the nature, scope,
and scale of copying (including of copyrighted materials) that took
place. To the contrary, the courts' approaches both in Metro-GoldwynMayer and Universal Music Australia included an implied analysis
according to the following line of thought: presumably, a significant
extent of the file-sharing activity that takes place falls outside of the
fair use exemption. Therefore, when a court examines the imposition
of secondary liability on the producers of file-sharing software, the
court's overall hypothesis should be that when it comes to copyrighted
materials, a primary infringement took place.
Interestingly, this approach rests on a rule that is opposite to the
Sony rule of secondary liability. In Sony, a substantial amount of noninfringing uses by primary users was enough to provide
manufacturers of copying devices with de facto immunity from
secondary liability.3 2 In the file-sharing decisions, however, courts
had practically presumed the opposite: a substantial amount of
infringing uses by primary users was enough for analyzing the
secondary liability of file-sharing software producers under the
presumption that at least with regard to copyrighted materials, the
activity of end-users, as a whole, constituted primary infringements
33
of copyright.
Being aware of this element, the reading of Universal Music
Australia becomes even more troubling. Recall that the court had
required the defendants to filter and screen out files that by their
names and meta-data were presumed to be files with copyrighted
works. 34 One cannot overlook the unjustified presumption that in all

32.
33.
Austl. Pty
34.

Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 125 S. Ct. 2764; Universal Music
Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (2005) 220 A.L.R. 1.
See Universal Music Austl., 220 A.L.R. at 7.

Continuation of the Kazaa Internet file-sharing system (including the provision
of software programs to new users) shall not be regarded as a contravention of
order 4 if that system is first modified pursuant to a protocol, to be agreed
between the infringing respondents and the applicants, or to be approved by
the Court, that ensures either of the following situations: (I): that: (a) the
software program received by all new users of the Kazaa file-sharing system
contains non-optional key word filter technology that excludes from the
displayed blue file search results all works identified (by titles, composers' or
performers' names or otherwise) in such lists of their copyright works as may
be provided, and periodically updated, by any of the applicants; and (b) all
future versions of the Kazaa file-sharing system contain the said non-optional
key word filter technology; and (c) maximum pressure is placed on existing
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circumstances the downloading of a copyrighted file would fall outside
the fair dealing defense. Even within the Australian structure of a
"close" fair dealing defense that is bounded by a limited number of
purposes, this assumption seems overly broad. Thus, for example,
end-users could download copyrighted materials for purposes of
research, study, criticism, or review, each and every case according to
its own merits.
More broadly, it is questionable whether the standard of
negligence that was imposed by the Australian court fully took into
consideration the fact that at least in some circumstances, the
downloading of copyrighted works with the assistance of file-sharing
software might be sheltered under one of copyright law's exemptions
and limitations. If secondary liability is aimed at capturing activities
that provide means and tools for primary infringements, there is no
justification for imposing a duty of care on producers of file-sharing
software when it comes to non-infringing uses of copyrighted
materials. Moreover, one could even claim the opposite: when taking
into account users' rights, there should be a reverse duty of care to
35
enable legitimate downloads of copyrighted materials.
As for the U.S. context, this sweeping approach toward primary
liability of end-users is partially curbed by the relatively high burden
that the inducement theory sets as a prerequisite for imposing
secondary liability on third parties. 36 In the Australian context,
however, the situation is more complicated due to the accumulation
of: (1) a generalized assumption regarding the primary liability of
end-users who download copyrighted materials and (2) a negligencetype rule that sets the standard for secondary liability. These two
holdings together might lead to a de facto strict liability rule that
prevents the use of file-sharing software for legitimate downloads of
copyrighted works.
This last point also illustrates one major conceptual drawback in
making third party liability doctrines a central legal source for
regulating peer-to-peer file-sharing of copyrighted materials:
copyright law's third party liability doctrines are preconditioned on
the imposition of direct liability on a primary infringer-in the

users, by the use of dialogue boxes on the Kazaa website, to upgrade their
existing Kazaa software program to a new version of the program containing
the said non-optional key word filter technology; or (II) that the TopSearch
component of the Kazaa system will provide, in answer to a request for a work
identified in any such list, search results that are limited to licensed works and
warnings against copyright infringement and that will exclude provision of a
copy of any such identified work.
Id.
35.
For a similar view, though not in the context of file-sharing, see generally
Dan L.Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructurefor Rights Management Systems,
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001).

36.

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 125 S. Ct. at 2780-83.
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context of peer-to-peer file-sharing-an end-user. 37 This structure of
legal liability suffers from two potential faults. First, it precludes the
possibility of imposing liability on central "third party" gatekeepersintermediaries and manufacturers-without having the need to
couple such liability together with the imposition of direct-primary
liability on end-users. A second fault is the fact that, as mentioned
above, in order to impose legal liability (and, therefore, duty of care)
on third parties that govern and control the downloading activity of
many end-users, courts are driven to implement generalized and
overbroad assumptions regarding primary liability of end-users.
One challenge that courts have ignored thus far is how to create
a "secondary" liability regime without coupling it together with the
imposition of liability on an end-user as a primary infringer. Once
departing from the conjuring up between the liability of central
intermediaries, such as file-sharing software producers, and the
liability of end-users, the imposition of liability on third parties could
be constructed differently: not as a tool for preventing what is
seemingly a mass accumulation of particular primary infringements
by end-users, but rather as a flexible vessel for internalizing the
various benefits, detriments, and values that peer-to-peer file-sharing
activity tends to generate.
By presenting this proposal, the Author is not ignoring the risk
that once giving up a requirement for primary infringement, third
parties might be exposed to unwarranted, broad legal liability. This
in turn would generate over-deterrence and with it excessive levels of
monitoring and filtering practices that undermine the benefits and
positive externalities of peer-to-peer file-sharing activities. Part IV
infra will further elaborate the argument for a requirement of
compliance between third party liability regimes and the imperative
of copyright law's exemptions and limitations. Nevertheless, once
aware of such hazards, the imposition of liability on third parties
could be culminated rightfully without suffering from the defaults
that dependence on primary liability of end-users tends to generate.
Indeed, under the current structure of a common law-based
secondary liability regime, adjusting such a framework would require
major transformations in our understanding of what "secondary"
liability means. Another option, which will be discussed in the
following Section, is the implementation of statutory (compulsory)
licenses and levy schemes that at least in some aspects imitate the
logic of the above-mentioned proposal, while translating it into a
framework of statutory exemptions for private copying.

37.
For a similar argument, though from another perspective, see Mark A.
Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1379-81 (2004).
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B. Statutory Compulsory Licenses and Levy Schemes - Lessons from
the CanadianExperience
In recent important works, both Neil Netanel and William Fisher
have proposed that the enforcement of copyright with regard to peerto-peer file-sharing platforms should be enforced ex-post through a
system of mandatory levies that would come together with a statutory
exemption for private and non-commercial copying of copyrighted
materials through peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms. 38 Such a
scheme would function as a form of blanket compulsory license,
authorizing copying under a specific exemption for private and noncommercial copying, in exchange for set fees that would be allocated
39
between copyright owners.
Both proposals rest on a framework that is well established in
European countries, such a Germany, 40 as well as in Canada. 41 In
fact, levies designed to provide equitable remuneration to copyright
owners for the private copying of their works have been part of the
42
law in many European countries since long before the digital age.
Even in the United States, there is the precedent of the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), which provides for a levy to be
charged on all blank digital audio media and digital audio recorders,
with the revenue to be allocated among music copyright owners. 43
The AHRA has not seen much use, but that is because the digital
audio recording systems covered by the Act never caught on.44

38.

See WILLIAM FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY LAW AND THE

FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT ch. 6 (2004); Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Nondommercial
Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-PeerFile Sharing, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 36 (2003).
39.
FISHER, supra note 38, at ch. 6; Netanel, supra note 38, at 36.
40.
For an illuminating survey and analysis of the private copying exemption
and the levies system in Germany, see Kateruna Gaita & Andrew F. Christie, Principle
of Compromise? Understanding the Original Thinking Behind Statutory License and
Levy Schemes for Private Copying, INTELL. PROP. Q. 422 (2004). For a comparative
survey and analysis of other European countries, see generally P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ,
LUCIE GUIBAULT & SJOERD VAN GEFFEN, THE FUTURE OF LEVIES IN A DIGITAL
ENVIRONMENT:
FINAL
REPORT
(2003),
available
at

http://www.ivir.nllpublications/other/DRM&levies-report.pdf.
As the authors of this
document indicate, levies designed to provide equitable remuneration to copyright
owners for private copying of their works have been part of the law in many European
nations since before the digital age, often covering photocopying and "home taping" of
music. Id. at 10-13.
41.
See Fara Tabatabai, A Tale of Two Countries: Canada's Response to the
Peer-to-Peer Crises and What in Means for the United States, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
2321, 2334-36 (2005).
42.

See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND

PRACTICE 312-13 (2001).
43.
17 U.S.C. §§ 1004-07 (2004).
44.

See id. § 1001(3).

A digital audio recording device is any machine or device of a type commonly
distributed to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not included with
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A full discussion regarding the pros and cons of compulsory
licensing levy schemes for peer-to-peer file-sharing exceeds the scope
of this Article. 45 The discussion in the following paragraphs will be
limited to a few comments of comparison between a compulsory
licensing levy scheme, such as the one offered by the Canadian
copyright system, and the other option of third party liability as it
was already described in previous Parts.
In 1997, the Canadian parliament added sections to the
Canadian Copyright Act which legalized private copying. 46 The
private copying exemption in Article 80(1) of the Canadian Copyright
Act specifically allows for the copying of musical works onto "audio
recording medium" for the private use of the person making the
copy. 47 The Canadian Copyright Act defines in Article 79 "audio
recording medium" as any media "onto which a sound recording may
be reproduced, and that is of a kind ordinarily used by individual
consumers for that purpose. '48 To compensate artists for lost royalties
due to private copying, Article 82 of the Copyright Act requires all
manufacturers and importers of blank audio recording media sold in
Canada to pay a levy. 4 9 According to Articles 83-85 of the Copyright
Act, the Canadian Copyright Board is responsible for setting the levy
rate. 50 The money from this levy then goes to collecting societies for
51
the benefit of eligible authors, makers, and performers.
The Canadian levy system in its current form was legislated
before the phenomenon of peer-to-peer file-sharing emerged. Yet, as
52
the decision of the first instance federal court in BMG Canada
demonstrates, at least according to some views, this levy system could
have a major impact on the embrace of an approach in which neither
the downloading nor the uploading of copyrighted musical works

or as part of some other machine or device, the digital recording function of
which is designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is capable
of, making a digital audio copied recording for private use, except for-(A)
professional model products, and (B) dictation machines, answering machines,
and other audio recording equipment that is designed and marketed primarily
for the creation of sound recordings resulting from the fixation of nonmusical
sounds.
Id.
45.
For such a discussion, see Lemley & Reese, supra note 37, at 1406-10;
Netanel, supra note 38, at pt. IV.
46.
Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. 24 (1997) (Can.).
47.

Id. at art. 80(1).

48.
Id. at art. 79.
49.
Id. at art. 82.
50.
Id. at arts. 83-85.
51.
Id. at art. 84.
52.
BMG Can., Inc. v. Doe, [2004] F.C. 241, 260. Nevertheless, as the following
paragraphs will illustrate, the court of appeals' decision in that case was much more
cautious in its approach regarding the legality of peer-to-peer file-sharing. See
generally BMG Can., Inc. v. Doe, [2005] F.C. 81.
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through peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms would constitute illegal
activity.
In BMG Canada, the Canadian Recording Industry Association
(CRIA) brought an action against five Canadian ISPs to compel
disclosure of the identities of twenty-nine customers who allegedly
engaged in file-sharing of copyrighted works. 53 One of the criteria for
granting such relief was that the applicant must establish a prima
facie case against the alleged wrongdoer. The federal court
determined that the downloading of a song for personal use fell
within the private copying exemption in Article 80(1) of the Canadian
Copyright Act. 54 The court then stated that the uploading of a
musical file through a peer-to-peer file-sharing platform did not
constitute infringement either. 55
Although under the Canadian
Copyright Act an individual may be found liable for direct
infringement for "authorizing" the reproduction of a copyrighted
work, 56 the court refused to classify the making available of a musical
file for downloading as an act of "authorization." 57 Based on a
previous decision of the Canadian Supreme Court, 58 the court
observed that "authorization" requires a degree of intent as well as a
requirement that a person has sanctioned, approved, and
countenanced copyright infringement-conditions that in the court's
view, were not met in the context of uploading a file through a peerto-peer file-sharing platform. 59 Then, drawing on the Canadian
Supreme Court's holding in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of
Upper Canada,60 the court added that there is
[no] real difference between a library that places a photocopy machine
in a room full of copyrighted material and a computer user that places a
personal copy on a shared directory linked to a P2P service. In either
case the preconditions to copying and infringement are set up but the
61
element of authorization is missing.

In a similar manner, the court refused to classify the uploading
stage as an infringement of copyright owners' "right of distribution"
according to Article 27(2)(b) of the Canadian Copyright Act.6 2 The
court's opinion in this context was that an act of "distribution" does
not occur merely by placing copyrighted music files in a shared
directory where other file-sharers could access them. Rather,

53.
BMG Can., [2004] F.C. at 243.
54.
Id. at 259.
55.
Id. at 259-61.
56.
See Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, art 3(1) (1985) (Can.).
57.
BMG Can., [2004] F.C. at 260.
58.
See Muzak Corp. v. Composers, Authors and Publishers Ass'n of Can.,
[1953] 2 S.C.R. 182, 193.
59.
BMG Can., [2004] F.C. at 192.
60.
[2004] S.C.R. 339, 379.
61.
See BMG Can., [2004] F.C. at 260.
62.
Id. at 261.
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distribution requires some positive act by the uploading user, such as
sending out copyrighted songs or advertising that they were available
63
for downloading.
Overall, the federal court's decision sets a good example for a
system that operates under a shadow background rule that exempts
private copying from the risk of copyright infringement while
compensating copyright owners through a levy system. Such a system
seems to do more than just shield individuals from being liable for
downloading copyrighted works through peer-to-peer file-sharing
software. In addition, based on the implied logic that secondary
liability is preconditioned upon a primary infringement, such a
framework also has the tendency of driving courts toward a narrow
interpretation of the legal sources through which the liability of third
parties is determined. 64 The court of appeals in BMG Canada,
however, had a different understanding of the potential legal liability
for peer-to-peer file-sharing under Canadian copyright law.

63.
See id. at 260-61. It should be mentioned that the court's reasoning in this
context was based on the fact that the current Canadian Copyright Act does not give a
copyright holder the exclusive right to make his or her work available to the public.
See id. Hence, in the absence of such a right, a person who uploads music does not
violate any of the creator's exclusive rights. Although the World Intellectual Property
Organization Copyright Treaty (WCT), which Canada signed in 1997, includes a
"making available" right, Canada has yet to ratify the WCT. World Intellectual
Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 6, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 69, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/enip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html [hereinafter WCT]. Thus, it
does not currently form any part of the Canadian Copyright Act, making file-sharing
legal under Canadian copyright law.
64.
To exemplify the manner in which such an approach functions, it is worth
emphasizing two additional facts that are relevant to fully understand the. court's
decision and its potential implications. The first is that, basically, the right of
distribution according to Article 27(2)(b) of the Canadian Copyright Act, as well as the
right to authorize a reproduction of a copyrighted work according to Article 3(1), could
be infringed, even if the downloading of a musical file for private use is exempted from
copyright infringement under Article 80. With regard to the stage of uploading files
onto a peer-to-peer file-sharing system, BMG Canada did not deal with common lawbased contributory and vicarious liability that is legally preconditioned on the existence
of a primary infringement.
Rather, the decision analyzed the components of
"authorization" and "distribution" as distinct and independent potential sources for
establishing primary copyright infringement by the act of "uploading" copyrighted files
to the peer-to-peer file-sharing system. See generally BMG Can., [2004] F.C. 241. The
second point refers to the fact that according to Article 80(2)(b) of the Canadian
Copyright Act, the exemption for private copying does not apply if the private copying
was done for the purpose of "distribution," "whether or not for the purpose of trade."
Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. 24 (1997) (Can.). Both facts emphasize the broad range of
options that the Canadian court had in deciding the merits of legal liability for peer-topeer file-sharing activity. Literally, someone downloading or uploading a copyrighted
file through a peer-to-peer distribution network could have been found liable for
copyright infringement according to the above-mentioned relevant Articles in the
Canadian Copyright Act. Yet, the federal court treated the exemption for private
copying as its compass in determining the contours of legal liability for file-sharing of
copyrighted materials.
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The decision of the federal court in BMG Canada was appealed
by the record companies. 65 Although the court of appeals upheld the
federal court's decision and dismissed the appeal, it did so solely
based on determinations that focused on the privacy concerns that
the case had raised. 66 With regard to the question of whether the
downloading and uploading of copyrighted files through a peer-topeer file-sharing network constitutes copyright infringement, the
court of appeals' approach was much more cautious than the federal
court's approach.
The court of appeals declined to conclude within the preliminary
stages of the action whether copyright infringements indeed took
place. 67 Notwithstanding this refusal, the decision in the appeal still
includes several remarks that support findings that both downloading
and uploading of copyrighted files through a peer-to-peer file-sharing
network might constitute copyright infringements. 68 For one, the
court of appeals had questioned whether peer-to-peer file-sharing
indeed involves reproduction on an audio recording medium and
therefore could shelter the exemption for private copying according to
Article 80(1) of the Canadian Copyright Act. 69 In addition, the court
of appeals questioned whether in the context of peer-to-peer filesharing the act of private copying had not been done "for the purposes
of distribution" and therefore, under Article 80(2)(b) the exemption
for private copying would no longer apply. 70 Lastly, the court of
appeals doubted the federal court's interpretation of the terms
"authorization" and "distribution" while raising the possibility that
these terms were broad enough to capture within them actions that
make copyrighted materials available for downloading through peer71
to-peer networks.
When taking into account the different directions taken by the
federal court and the court of appeals, the Canadian experience might
teach one lesson: by itself a levy scheme provides no magic solutions
for the dilemmas that peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms raise, at
least as long as the exemption for private copying and the levy
scheme have been established prior to the emergence of peer-to-peer
file-sharing. This observation should not come as a surprise because
in itself a mere formal existing framework of a levy scheme does not
provide answers to the various policy questions that the phenomenon
of file-sharing raises.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See BMG Can., Inc. v. Doe, [2005] F.C. 81, 83.
Id. at 83-85.
Id. at 85-86.
See id. at 106-09.
Id. at 107-08.
Id.; see also supra note 64 (discussing Article 80(2)(b)).
BMG Can., [2005] F.C. at 108.
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Moreover, in some aspects, the binary nature of an exemption for
private copying, as a zero-sum formula, might also be seen as an
obstacle for using such a scheme as a framework for regulating peerto-peer file-sharing activity.
The two extreme solutions of full
primary liability or full primary immunity are not malleable enough
to take into account the delicate distinctions between different
circumstances of copying and the different parties that are involved
in the process of peer-to-peer file-sharing. The remaining Parts of the
Article will inspect more closely several particular instances that are
related to peer-to-peer file-sharing as a social, economic, and cultural
phenomenon and, by doing so, will highlight at least part of the
complicated web of considerations that should be taken into account
in this context.

IV. ADJUSTING A REQUIREMENT OF COMPLIANCE BETWEEN THIRD
PARTY LIABILITY REGIMES AND COPYRIGHT LAW'S
EXEMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Third party liability regimes for primary copyright infringements
inherently raise the question of compliance with copyright law's
exemptions and limitations. By their purpose and nature, third party
liability regimes are intended to regulate the activity of end-users.
Therefore, ideally, third party liability should be imposed only in
circumstances when the primary use of copyrighted material is
classified as an infringing use rather than a use that is protected
under one of copyright law's exemptions and limitations. 72 Any
broader liability of third parties would interfere with the limitation
and burden uses that are socially desirable, for instance where
according to an economic cost-benefit analysis it should have been
73
permitted.
A requirement of compliance of third party liability regimes and
copyright law's exemptions and limitations calls to attention several
features that are associated with the imposition of such liability.
First, there is the chilling effect that tends to come along with the
imposition of third party liability. Third party liability is likely to
have a deterrent effect under which in order to avoid the risk of legal
liability, as well as decrease their information and enforcement costs,

72.
One could claim, however, that while distinguishing between infringing and
non-infringing uses is very costly, some generalizations must be made, even as a cost
that is imposed either on copyright owners or on the rights of users and the public in
general. As infra Part V will further outline, this is a choice that should be guided by
weighing and allocating the risk between positive and negative externalities that peerto-peer file-sharing platforms tend to generate.
73.
See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600 (1982).
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third parties would impose restrictions on legitimate file-sharing of
74
copyrighted materials.
Indeed, one can assume that at least to some extent, third
parties, such as software producers, might also compete over the
provision of peer-to-peer platforms that enable risky uses-those that
bear a higher exposure to legal liability and that also impose costs of
distinguishing between lawful and unlawful uses. Yet, as some
scholars have argued convincingly, 75 in the context of intermediaries
such as internet service providers, the likelihood for robust
competition is relatively minor for two main reasons: first, the limited
significance of monitoring as a factor for consumers in choosing an
internet service provider, and secondly, the high transaction costs
that would be involved in negotiating the degree of monitoring and its
pricing.
Another related feature is the positive externalities that peer-topeer file-sharing platforms tend to generate that are not internalized
either by end-users or by third parties on whom contributory liability
is imposed. 76 There are many advantages and social utilities that filesharing platforms generate, both in terms of inducing technological
innovation and in terms of enabling the production and distribution
of diversified content portfolios, including content that otherwise
would not have been produced and distributed, such as educational,
documentary, and political materials. Since such activities are
characterized by significant positive externalities, the legal risk that
third party liability generates could have direct implications on the
prevention of such uses, especially if distinguishing between
legitimate uses of such kinds and infringing uses is a process that
imposes costs on third parties.
Another central attribute of third party liability regimes, at least
in the context of peer-to-peer file-sharing, is the fact that they are
usually based on generalized proximity rules rather than on an ad
hoc examination of each and every particular case according to its
factual merits. Judicial determinations with regard to both the
nature of uses that file-sharing platforms enable and the implications
that different third party liability regimes might have, are based on
proximity rules rather than on findings of fact with regard to each
and every particular case.

74.
75.

See Landes & Lichtman, supra note 16, at 406.
See generally Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL

L. REV. 901 (2002).

76.
Positive and negative externalities occur when the impacts of a product
overreach the direct effects of its production and consumption and therefore influence
many individuals, as well as society at large. A related instance of positive and
negative externalities refers to circumstances in which direct users of a product
internalize only some parts of its benefits or costs or when problems of collective action
frustrate the ability of a fragmented bundle of users to signal and acquire their desired
products.
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The prior discussion regarding Universal Music Australia and
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer sets a good example for the manner in which
such proximity rules operate: in both cases, when determining the
legal liability of third parties, the courts relied on a certain set of
generalized assumptions. In Universal Music Australia,the court had
an implicit generalized, though unjustified, assumption that a
primary infringement occurs whenever copyrighted materials are
exchanged through the file-sharing platform, and therefore such files
should be identified and then blocked by the software filtering and
screening mechanisms. On the other hand, in Sony and later in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the U.S. Supreme Court's assumption was
that at least some of the files exchanged through the peer-to-peer filesharing platform were non-infringing uses. The subsequent
conclusion was that in itself, the production and distribution of filesharing platforms should not impose legal liability for indirect
copyright infringement. 77 In both cases, however, it was generalized
78
proximity rules that navigated the courts in their rulings.
Rather than merely reflecting reality, such proximity rules also
have normative and therefore constitutive implications on the nature
of uses that peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms occupy. As in many
other instances, through their determinations and assumptions
regarding the implications and characteristics of peer-to-peer
platforms, courts are not only reflecting reality but are also
constructing and shaping the contours of future file-sharing
activities. 79 Therefore, the design of such proximity rules must
include a normative imperative to consider and thus enable
compliance between third party liability regimes and copyright law's
exemptions and limitations. A normative imperative becomes a
compelling necessity in a digitized environment where the
implications of third party liability regimes tend to be translated
directly into technological measures that third parties adopt to save
themselves from legal liability. When such technological measures
are constructed without compliance with copyright law's exemptions
and limitations, one can expect that the design and structure of peer-

77.

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780

(2005).
78.
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer also sets a
good example for how different proximity rules can influence the design of third party
liability regimes: Justice Breyer's opinion emphasized both the diverse variety of noninfringing uses that flourish through file-sharing platforms and the legal uncertainly,
as well as chilling effect, that a broad liability rule would cause. Id. at 2790-91, 2793
(Breyer, J., concurring).
Once relying on such proximity rules, Justice Breyer's
understanding of third party liability was very mindful of the need for compliance
between copyright law's exemptions and limitations and the legal liability that is
imposed on third parties. Id.
79.
For a similar but more generalized argument, see generally Julie E. Cohen,
Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97
MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998-1999).
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to-peer file-sharing platforms would not reflect the balancing schemes
that copyright law implements.
An example for such circumstances could be found again in the
Australian case of Universal Music Australia. Once the court imposed
a generalized duty to implement technological measures such as nonoptional keyword and metadata filtering mechanisms on producers of
file-sharing software, 8 0 one could expect that the design of future
peer-to-peer platforms would also block legitimate uses of copyrighted
materials. Moreover, in a digital environment, even if courts did not
detail the scheme through which third parties should comply with
their legal duties, any third party liability would be expected to have
its imprint on the design of file-sharing software and consequently
the manner in which it would regulate the activities and liberties of
81
its users.
In several respects, the call for compliance between copyright
law's exemptions and legal regimes of third party liability resembles
another emerging digital concern: the call for compliance between
digital rights management systems and copyright law exemptions
and limitations. 82 A major concern surrounding digital rights
management (DRM) systems, as well as technological protection
measures in general, is overextension of DRM protection in a manner
that overrides copyright's limitations and exemptions. By using either
technological measures or contractual protection schemes (in many
circumstances along with reliance on statutory prohibitions against
the circumvention of the technological protection measures through
which the copyrighted work is packaged83 ), DRM systems shrink and

80.
220 A.L.R.
81.
have been

Universal Music Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (2005)
1, 5, 59.
In this context, the notions of software as regulation and code as regulation
widely recognized and developed in the last decade. See LAWRENCE LESSIG,

CODE AND OTHER LAW OF CYBERSPACE 89 (1996) (discussing the constraining effect of

code and software on behavior in cyberspace); James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace:
Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 177 (1997)
(expressing a "preference for technological solutions to hard legal issues on-line"); Joel
R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulationof Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554-55 (1998) (arguing that "[t]echnological
capabilities and system design choices impose rules on participants").
For an excellent comparative analysis of this issue, see generally Stefan
82.
Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM. J. COMP.
L. 323 (2004). See also Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle:
Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA's Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 112 (2005).
On the international level, such provisions may be found in two treaties
83.
adopted in 1996 under the aegis of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO). Article 11 of the WCT, which went into force on March 6, 2002, outlaws the
circumvention of effective technological measures used by copyright owners to protect
their works. WCT, supra note 63, at art. 11. A similar provision protecting performers
and producers of phonograms may be found in Article 18 of the WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), which went into force on May 20, 2002. World
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 18, Dec.
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set aside the domain that is governed and empowered by copyright
law's exemptions and limitations.
Concerns over such developments have been discussed
extensively by scholars,8 4 and at least in a few countries, such as
Australia and European countries, legislatures have taken some
statutory steps in this direction."5 Most legislatures have attempted

20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 87, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/
trtdocswo034.html.
In the United States, Congress enacted complex anticircumvention regulations as part of the DMCA of 1998. See Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2004).
The DMCA arranges its anticircumvention provisions along two dimensions.
First, it distinguishes between
technological protection measures that "controln access to a work" (access control) and
measures that "protect right[s] of the copyright owner" (usage control). Id. §§ 120102. Secondly, it distinguishes between the actual circumvention of technological
protection measures and preparatory activities, in particular the production and
distribution of tools that can be used to circumvent such measures. Id. § 1201(b).
Whereas the DMCA prohibits the actual circumvention and preparatory activities in
regard to access control technologies, it only targets preparatory activities in regard to
usage control technologies.
Id. §§ 1201-02.
In the European Union, the most
important anti-circumvention regulation may be found in the Copyright Directive of
2001, which had to be implemented by the Member States of the European Union by
December 22, 2002. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council Directive of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L167) 8-9
[hereinafter Copyright Directive]. Article 6(1) of this Directive prohibits the actual
circumvention of any "effective" technological measure that is used by the rights
holders of any copyright or neighboring right to protect their works. Id. Article 6(2)
prohibits a wide range of preparatory activities, including the production, distribution,
promotion, or "possession for commercial purposes" of devices that "have only a limited
commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent" or are at least
"primarily designed . . . [to enable] the circumvention" of technological protection
measures. Id. In general, the anti-circumvention regulations of Article 6(1) and (2)
provide a very broad protection of DRM systems.
84.
See, e.g., Bechtold, supra note 82, at 359-81 and the sources cited therein
(discussing overextension of DRM protection); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to
Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 359-60 (1999) (arguing that the control access provisions of the
DMCA are "problematic" because "they can prevent access to information whether or
not the information's producer has a legal right to control it"); Burk & Cohen, supra
note 35, at 42, 48 (submitting that DRM has the potential to confer a degree of control
over access to and use of digital content that goes well beyond the rights given by
copyright law).
85.
See Bechtold, supra note 82, at 365-81. One such example is Section
116A(4) of the Australian Copyright Act of 1968, which declares that the statutory
prohibition regarding the circumvention of technological protection measures that
protect copyrighted material do not apply
in relation to the making or importing of a circumvention device: (a) for use
only for a permitted purpose relating to a work or other subject-matter that is
not readily available in a form that is not protected by a technological
protection measure; (b) for the purpose of enabling a person to supply the
device or to supply a circumvention service, for use only for a permitted
purpose.
Copyright Act, 1968, § 116A(4) (Austl.).
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to set limits and boundaries on the use of technological measures and
DRM systems as a mechanism for extending control over copyrighted
that shelter under an
materials with regard to legitimate actions
86
exemption such as the fair use defense.
It could be argued that a similar approach should be advocated
when courts are required to decide the scope and boundaries of legal
liability that third parties should bear regarding their involvement in
the production, distribution, and facilitation of peer-to-peer filesharing platforms and devices. Theoretically and normatively, this
would mean that the legal liability of third parties should be limited
to circumstances in which reproduction of copyrighted materials is
not protected by one of copyright law's exemptions and limitations.
Practically, however, it would be very difficult and costly to
implement such a distinctive parameter with a high degree of
accuracy, mostly because third parties do not regularly obtain the
information that would enable them to identify prospective uses of
copyrighted materials that are being downloaded. Moreover, as
are
platforms
file-sharing
peer-to-peer
explained,
already
characterized by the fact that they simultaneously facilitate the
activity of numerous individuals-a fact that practically leaves no
choice other then relying on policy-based proximity rules.
Consequently, any steps in the direction of compliance between
liability of third parties and copyright law's exemptions and
limitations require a policy-based decision regarding the allocation of
risk between the interests of copyright owners on the one hand and
the interests of users and the general public on the other hand. This
last issue is the focus of the next Part.

V. PEER-TO-PEER FILE-SHARING: ALLOCATING THE RISK
BETWEEN COMPETING INTERESTS AND POSITIVE
AND NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES

Peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms constitute an arena that
coordinates and regulates communicative activities of many
individuals. Like in many other contexts, different legal regimes of
third party liability have both direct and indirect impacts on the
various interests as well as positive and negative externalities that
peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms implicate. Listing all the interests
and externalities that peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms are
associated with would be impossible. It is, however, important to note
that as will be further explained, such a list includes much more than
just the private pecuniary interests of copyright owners or the public
interest in promoting technological innovation (as such an interest is

86.

Id.
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embodied in innovative technological devices that are capable of
"substantial non-infringing uses").8 7
Peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms are for one thing a central
resource-in many aspects a public good-through which individuals
are able to distribute and obtain information, creative works,
communicative materials, and a large variety of other intangible
resources that have a social value. 88 In many instances such
resources might not have been available in traditional modes of
content distribution, such as those based on a relationship between
the content producer/distributor and consumers. This is not only
because of the fact that peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms decrease,
spread, and fragmentize the costs of distributing and obtaining
intangible content among many individual users, but also because
peer-to-peer platforms reconstruct social control over the means of
distributing creative and informational goods-a point that will be
further addressed in the following Part.
Turning to another related aspect, peer-to-peer file-sharing
platforms also tend to generate a significant amount and range of
positive externalities. One example is the potential political
enhancing function of bottom-up distribution capabilities of
informational materials that otherwise would not be distributed
through more traditional channels of communication. Another
example is the long-term cultural impacts that exposure to diverse
creative materials through peer-to-peer platforms might have on
individuals. More generally, peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms cover
a very wide range of autonomy-based social benefits that serve free
speech values with regard to both speakers and recipients of content
89
and information.

87.
This consideration is well known as the legacy of Sony. Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984); see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2777-78 (2005) (citing Sony for the
doctrine of substantial non-infringing use).
88.
See Brett M. Frischmann, Peer-to-Peer Technology as Infrastructure:An
Economic Argument for Retaining Sony's Safe Harbor for Technologies Capable of

Substantial Non-infringing Uses, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 329, 329 (2005) (arguing
that "socially valuable non-infringing uses should be recognized as substantial").
89.
Id. at 339-41. The link between diversity and freedom of speech as a
constitutional value relates both to democratic-political aspects of free speech and to
free speech as the bedrock of individual autonomy. In both aspects, freedom of speech
establishes not just the rights of speakers but also the rights of the audience-the
recipients, who rely on diversified, robust, and pluralistic expressive activity. The
democracy-based defense of free speech is famously associated with Alexander
Meiklejohn.

See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION

TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). For autonomy-based accounts, see generally Joseph
Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 303
(1991); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204

(1972).
See also Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 37-43 (2002) (arguing that copyright law should be
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As previous Parts have already indicated, different legal regimes
of third party liability impose different risks on each of the various
interests and externalities that peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms
involve. The broader the liability of third parties, the higher the risk
(or phrased differently, the lower the chances) of the fulfillment and
internalization of social benefits, such as those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, that peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms tend to
generate. On the other hand, the narrower the liability of third
parties, the higher the risks of abridgment with regard to the
pecuniary interests of copyright owners. Undermining the ability of
copyright owners to impose legal liability on central and efficient
gatekeepers, such as producers of file-sharing software or internet
service providers, would undoubtedly have an impact on the
prevention of infringing activities. On the other end of the spectrum,
third parties that are facing extensive legal liability would be inclined
to increase precautions regardless of the costs of setting aside socially
beneficial aspects of peer-to-peer platforms-aspects that are far from
being fully internalized by such "self-interested" third parties.
Another lesson from the discussion thus far is the fact that any
allocation of risk between the various competing interests that are at
stake would have to be based, at least to some extent, on generalized
proximity rules rather than on fact specific ad-hoc allocation.
Regulators and courts thus face a "tragic choice" dilemma when
deciding the scope and nature of third parties' legal liability for
unauthorized peer-to-peer file-sharing of copyrighted materials. The
advancement and protection of some interests must come at the
expense of jeopardizing countervailing interests. It is important to
add, however, that the dilemma courts and legislatures are facing in
the context of peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms is different than the
dilemma that they would face in other contexts of third party liability
for copyright infringements, mostly because the interests and social
benefits that peer-to-peer platforms involve are different from those
in other instances of copyright infringements. Different scales are
therefore required to rightfully assess the appropriate allocation of
risk between the various interests that arise with third party liability
for peer-to-peer file-sharing copyright infringements.
There are various approaches one could take regarding the
question of which of the competing interests should bear the higher
risk of being undermined and infringed as a result of the third party
legal liability regime chosen. On one side stand legal systems, such as
the British system, 90 that perceive and emphasize the nature of

subordinate to the freedom of imagination implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution as
enforced by federal courts).
90.
See generally Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd, [2001] EWCA Civ 1142
(U.K.), available at http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/judgmentsfiles/677/civil_
ashdown.htm (discussing the conflict between freedom of speech and copyright after
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copyright as a proprietary right aimed to protect the private
pecuniary interests of copyright owners. These legal systems would
be willing to place a significant share of the legal risk on the various
positive externalities and public-oriented interests that peer-to-peer
file-sharing platforms tend to generate. 91 On the other side of the
ocean, legal systems such as the U.S. system emphasize the
regulatory and public nature of copyright as a mechanism whose sole
purpose is advancing the public interest in a robust and diversified
creative environment. 92 Such copyright systems would accommodate
much more easily a higher risk of abridgement on proprietary
interests of copyright owners. Sony and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer are
perfect examples of this willingness of the U.S. legal system, as
opposed to the approach that was implemented by the federal court
of Australia in Universal Music Australia.
Reality, however, becomes slightly more complicated once a
copyright system aims to be based on a complex and diversified set of
values and goals that integrates both public-oriented goals and
respect for the private interests of copyright owners. With regard to
such a framework, there are no clear-cut recipes as to the desired
allocation of risk between the various competing interests.
There is, however, one consideration that might support a
narrow approach to the legal liability of third parties: that is, an
approach that places a higher degree of risk on copyright owners
while establishing a fertile ground for supporting and advancing the
various positive spillovers and beneficial externalities that derive
from the activity of peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms.
This
consideration is the differential and preferential ability of copyright

the enactment of the British Human Rights Act 1998, while emphasizing that
copyright law is based on recognizing and respecting the private interests of creators
and copyright owners, including the status of such rights and interests as part of the
constitutional right to private property (under the first protocol of the European
Convention of Human Rights as implemented by the British Human Rights Act)).
91.
But see Robert Danay, Copyright vs. Free Expression: The Case of Peer-topeer File-sharingof Music in the United Kingdom, INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y, Autumn

2005, at 2 (presenting the view that, under Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights as implemented by the British Human Rights Act, peer-to-peer music
file-sharing should be permitted, at least partially, within the British copyright law).
This approach, however, does not seem to reflect the views of courts in the United
Kingdom.
92.
See generally Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in
Historical Perspective, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319 (2003). There are, of course,
numerous scholarly works regarding this matter, as well as the fact that at least in
some aspects, even U.S. copyright law has been partially influenced by author-based
theories (e.g., the important work of Professor Jane Ginsburg of Colombia Law School).
Nevertheless, overall, U.S. copyright laws, including its constitutional merits, are
based mostly on a regulatory public-oriented paradigm of copyright law. See generally
RAY L. PATTERSON & STANLEY LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT - A LAW OF

USER'S RIGHTS (2004) (discussing focus of U.S. law on legal rights of individuals to use
copyrighted materials).
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owners in overcoming risks that a narrow legal regime of third party
liability exposes them to, as opposed to the very limited chances of
overcoming the potential social losses that are associated with broad
This last point requires further
legal liability of third parties.
explanation.
Many social benefits of peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms are
positive spillovers-ricochets that are generated by the overall
operation of such platforms.9 3 Consequently, it is probable that any
burdens and limitations on such social benefits, including limitations
that derive from broad legal liability of third parties, would not be
fully internalized. Since the main issue at stake is unfulfilled positive
externalities, one can expect that many of the people who engage in
peer-to-peer file-sharing activities will not have the required
incentives to invest resources in developing mechanisms that would
supplement and complement elements that are no longer protected
under a legal regime that imposes broad legal liability on third
parties.
Take, for example, circumstances in which file-sharing is used
for permitted uses of copyrighted materials-such as fair use-or
otherwise lawful dissemination of informational and creative
materials. In a legal regime that imposes liability on third parties,
many of these uses will be abridged and undermined. This is not only
because of the chilling and deterrent effects third parties would face
but also because of the different long-term dynamics in building the
design and architecture of peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms: under a
broad legal regime of third party liability, the structure, design, and
technological architecture of peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms is
expected to have a much stronger tendency toward commercialized
"walled-gardens" models-those that follow the demands of a legal
regime with broad requirements of copyright compliance. The crucial
point is, however, that given the low commercial viability of the
above-mentioned social benefits, there is a small chance that
individuals, who until now have benefited from the windfall of
positive spillovers that unregulated (commercialized) file-sharing
platforms generate, would be willing to invest time, resources, and

93.
See Frischmann, supra note 88, at 332. Frischmann develops a theory of
infrastructure resources which have three main characteristics: (1) these are resources
that generate value when used as inputs into a wide range of productive processes; (2)
the outputs from these processes are often public and non-market goods that generate
positive externalities that benefit society; and (3) managing infrastructure resources in
an openly accessible manner may be socially desirable when it facilitates these
downstream activities. Id. Accordingly, Frischmann's main conclusion is that once
taking into account the positive externalities and spillovers of infrastructure resources,
the law should adopt a legal regime with relatively broad open access and usage rights
to such resources and thus enable internalization of their "demand-side" attributes.
Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 956 (2005).
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coordination costs in culminating the design of file-sharing platforms
circumstances of
to re-optimize socially desired uses, especially under
94
facing potential risks of third party legal liability.
Copyright owners, on the other hand, are situated in a different
framework of incentives that better enables them to overcome at least
some of the risks to which an opposite legal regime of narrow third
party liability might expose them. Since copyright owners suffer
direct financial losses from copyright infringements that occur
through peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms, copyright owners are
incentivized to invest efforts and resources in the prevention of such
infringements. Overall, copyright owners do internalize the risks to
which a legal regime of narrow third party liability exposes them
because they are direct bearers of the financial harms that such a
legal regime tends to create for them. Consequently, even if their
ability to enforce legal liability on third parties is limited, copyright
owners would still attempt to enforce their rights against end-users
as well as invest resources in digitally protecting their copyrighted
devices.
materials, for example, through anti-circumvention
Narrowing the legal liability of third parties would indeed impose
some difficulties and costs on copyright owners. 95 Yet, as opposed to

By presenting this approach, the Author does not diminish the contribution
94.
of recent writings regarding the efficiency of common-based peer production
frameworks for the production and dissemination of informational works. See, e.g.,
Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J.
369 (2002). Nevertheless, the normative background and shadow-rules, including that
of third party legal liability for copyright infringements, would determine society's
ability to fully utilize and benefit from the prospects that such new frameworks of
information production offer.
95.
It should be mentioned, however, that there is contradictory evidence
regarding the impact of unauthorized file-sharing of copyrighted materials on the
financial interests of copyright owners. Likewise, contradictory evidence is apparent
regarding the question of whether restrictions on peer-to-peer file-sharing would
indeed advance the goal of securing a just reward for creators and copyright owners.
First, there are some doubts as to the accuracy of the assertion that file-sharing
extensively reduces traditional music sales. Secondly, even to the extent that filesharing could be tied to such a decline, the nature of corporate media industry as a
business that relies heavily on using the same media product in as many secondary
and derivative markets as possible also raises some doubts of the pros and cons of
unauthorized file-sharing of copyrighted materials. From this perspective, cultural
tastes that are shaped and constructed through peer-to-peer file-sharing leverage and
increase the demand for ancillary and related media products, such as live
performances, merchandizing, and others. For such arguments, including empirical
data that supports them, see generally Stan J. Liebowitz, Pitfalls in Measuring the
Impact of File-sharing, 51 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 435 (2005) (U.K.), available at
http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/ reprint/51/2-3/435; Eric S. Boorstin, Music Sales in
the Age of File Sharing, http://www. cs.princeton.edu/-felten/boorstin-thesis.pdf (last
visited Nov. 16, 2006); Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File
2005,
June
Analysis,
An
Empirical
Sales
Record
on
Sharing
http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/FileSharing- June2005_final.pdf; Martin Peitz &
Patrick Waelbroek, The Effect of Internet Piracy on CD Sales: Cross-Section Evidence,
Nov. 2003, http://www.merit.unimaas.nl/epip/ papers/waelbroeck-paper.pdf.
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the social interests that peer-to-peer file-sharing platform involve,
copyright owners are expected to internalize, confront, and deal with
96
various risks to their private interests.
Once taking into account this disparity between the risks that
copyright owners would face under a narrow legal regime of third
party liability, on one hand, and the risks that public and social
interests would face under a broad legal regime of third party liability
on the other hand, one could claim that the latter option should be
disfavored. Indeed, such an approach involves a political priority of
the public and social interests that peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms
advance, even at the cost of risking the private pecuniary interests of
copyright owners. However, as the next Part will illustrate, further
support for such priority-setting comes from a broader constitutional
viewpoint which perceives peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms as a
novel emerging speech resource.

VI. PEER-TO-PEER FILE-SHARING PLATFORMS AS A NEW EMERGING
SPEECH RESOURCE: DISTRIBUTIVE CONCERNS

Thus far, the discussion has analyzed peer-to-peer file-sharing
activity through the prism of various competing interests and
concerns that are at stake. This Part attempts to offer an additional
perspective that focuses on the nature of peer-to-peer file-sharing
platforms as a new emerging speech resource.
The term "speech resources" aims to capture the notion that
communicative, expressive, and creative activities require and rely on
unique (speech) resources such that together enable the creation,
production, and distribution of finalized media products as well as
other types of informational works. The various layers that together
construct a communicative-speech activity-the content layer, the
physical layer, and the layer of distribution-all comprise resources
that are both unique and essential for effective communicative and
speech
activities-producing,
distributing,
and
obtaining
informational and creative works. 97

96.
Seemingly, the above-mentioned approach raises the question of moral
hazard, that is the increased risk of peer-to-peer copyright infringements, because
third parties who have "caused" and contributed to the copyright infringements do not
suffer the full (or any) consequences of such a loss. Yet, this argument ignores the fact
that, likewise, a legal regime of broad third party liability would generate a parallel
(though reversed) moral hazard, only this time with regard to the positive externalities
and overall social benefits that peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms tend to generate. In
other words, since on both sides of the equation there are interests that deserve some
protection, the question in not one of moral hazard but rather of allocation of risk
between the competing interests.
97.
The distinction between the various layers is based on the work of Yochai
Benkler. See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures
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Occasionally, one could locate instances in which law identifies
and regulates speech resources, especially ones such as the spectrum
of airwaves for television and radio broadcasts. Yet these speech
resources seem to represent only a tip of the iceberg when one
attempts to locate the whole variety of speech resources that exist,
particularly in a communicative environment that is highly based on
technological components. Thus, for example, informational products
that are outcomes of data-mining processes, 98 are increasingly
becoming essential speech resources for obtaining effective audience
attention (or phrased differently: effective access to audiences), 99 as
well as both predicting and shaping tastes and preferences of
audiences.
Another example for primary speech resources that thus far have
been relatively veiled are technological developments with direct
implications on the various layers through which communicative,
creative, and speech activities are being constructed and executed.
As will be argued below, peer-to-peer file-sharing software and
platforms are paradigmatic examples for innovative technological
developments that practically reconstruct both the physical layer and
the distribution layer of communicative and speech activities. Other
instances of technological developments that have generated new
emerging speech resources are, for example, email protocols or

of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L. J. 561,
562 (2000). Benkler distinguishes between the physical layer, the logical layer, and the
content layer. Id. The Author prefers the distinction between the content layer, the
physical layer, and the layer of distribution to effective audience attention. It seems
that the logical layer, which deals with computer code that governs the production and
distribution of digital content, is a component that might apply to each of the three
central layers of communicative activity: the content layer, the physical later, and the
layer of distribution.
98.
Simply put, "data-mining" refers to computed processes for the collection,
storage, and analysis of information and data regarding the identity, characteristics,
consumption habits, as well as many other parameters of individuals and their
activities. It includes information obtained through the internet and other digitized
platforms for communicative and consumer-based activities, such as video-on-demand
or the purchasing of creative content through cellular platforms. See generally Tal Z.
Zarsky, Mine "Your Own Business!" Making the Case for the Implications of the Data
Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1
(2002-2003).
99.
The phrase "effective audience attention" (or "effective access to audiences")
emphasizes the fact that from a substantive perspective, the essential question
regarding speech resources and their allocation is this: when taking into account all
elements that compose and influence the allocation of speech powers, are there certain
categories of entities or individuals who gain priority in reaching the attention of the
audience? Such an analysis implements a realistic legal practice of scrutinizing actual
effects rather than formal ones. This approach was developed and applied in the
context of the First Amendment by Owen Fiss and later analyzed and defined directly
through the prism of legal realism jurisprudence by Jack Balkin. See Owen M. Fiss,
Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1424-25 (1986); Jack M.
Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 407-14 (1990).

118

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40:87

hyperlink technologies that enable linking between different web
pages, including techniques such as framing and inline linking. 10 0
Such technologies could and should be characterized as speech
resources because of their direct impact on the ability of both
speakers and audiences to engage in communicative, creative, and
speech activities, all in a manner and to an extent that were not
possible through preceding channels and platforms of communication.
A full and in-depth analysis of speech resources' attributes and
their regulation by law exceeds the limited scope of this Article. For
purposes of this Article, two observations regarding speech resources
should be emphasized. First, by their nature, speech resources tend to
confront society and regulators with distributive questions and
dilemmas regarding their allocation. Stated differently, speech
resources raise distributional concerns regarding control over them
and the legal regime that should govern the allocation of legal
entitlements in speech resources. The meaning of the term
"distributional concerns" in this context, however, should not be
misconceived as dealing with mere distribution of economic resources;
rather, the issue at stake is the allocation of constitutional-type
resources, such as those that are directly related to freedom of speech
and underlying values and therefore demand egalitarianism with
regard to the allocation of legal entitlements in speech resources. 10 1

100.
See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2002)
(discussing the use of framing and inline-linking techniques with regard to copyrighted
materials while classifying such actions as an infringement of copyright owners'
exclusive right of public display), withdrawn, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Niva ElkinKoren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right to Exclude
Indexing, 26 DAYTON L. REV. 180, 180 (2001) (discussing search engines as one such
technological development).
101.
For a related, though narrower, discussion, see Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1546-47 (2005)
(distribution of expressive opportunities). Surprising as it might be, if one sets aside
the unique issue of campaign finance, neither courts nor scholarly literature have dealt
extensively with concerns regarding the initial allocation of speech resources and the
normative principles that should govern the allocation of legal entitlements in speech
resources. Most current discussion focuses either on the rights of speakers or on
audience-reception theories, that is, theories regarding the rights of individuals as
recipients to have effective access to diversified, robust, and pluralistic expressive
activities as a prerequisite for advancing both individual autonomy and democratic
values. For a critical survey of such approaches and their historical-legal roots, see

Jack M. Balkin, Commentaries: Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 50-55 (2004).
Although such approaches to freedom of speech and their theoretical foundations are
expected to have distributive implications, the notion of speech resources and questions
regarding their initial allocation are missing within current paradigms of free speech.
The Author's basic argument in this context is that a more salient awareness of the
notion of speech resources and the distributive concerns that they raise would improve
legal practices of allocating and regulating speech resources toward a more egalitarian
and just framework, all in a manner that better fulfills the justifications and goals of
free speech.
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A related point worth emphasizing is the fact that either
explicitly or implicitly, society-through law in particular-is
constantly making choices and determinations that facilitate control
over speech resources as well as over the ability to access and use
speech resources. Such choices are implemented and reflected not
only through direct regulation of speech resources and control over
them (e.g., telecommunication and broadcasting regulation) but also
implicitly through private law legal regimes, such as property law.
The latter form, however, requires a closer inspection to expose its
role in regulating speech resources. Copyright law is a paradigmatic
illustration for a private law mechanism that, among other things,
allocates control over original creative works-speech resources-that
together construct prominent shares of what is practically the content
10 2
layer.
A second observation refers to the dynamic nature of speech
resources, that is, the fact that from time to time, innovative,
communicative, and technological developments tend to create new
types of speech resources which offer additional, alternative, and in
many circumstances, more effective frameworks for creative and
communicative activities. 103 Peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms
represent a paradigmatic example for a new speech resource that
implicates and transforms all three central layers of communicative
activity.
As for the physical layer, peer-to-peer file-sharing software and
end-to-end diffused networks of communication that the software
constructs are essentially a new physical-logical platform for both
delivering and receiving informational works. Similar observations
could be made with regard to the layer of distribution (the layer that
affects and controls the means for effective audience attention as well
as access to informational works). File-sharing platforms and the
networks they assemble empower new channels for both distributing
and obtaining creative materials, informational works, and a variety
of other intangible works. The significance of these new networks of

102.
The interface of copyright and freedom of speech has been widely
researched in the last decade. Several scholars have emphasized the manner in which
copyright law functions as a form of regulation of speech activities. Copyright law does
this by implicating the differential ability of distinct individuals and groups to access
and use copyrighted materials. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 84, at 357 (claiming that
copyright laws regulate society's information production and exchange process); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 12-26 (2001) (discussing copyright's constraints on free speech); Rubenfeld,
supra note 89, at 5-12 (demonstrating the existence of conflicts between copyright law
and the First Amendment).
103.
This notion was first observed by Harold Innis. See HAROLD A. INNIS, THE
BIAS OF COMMUNICATION (1951). The chapter in Innis' book, "Technology and Public
Opinion in the United States," id. at 156-89, which represents most of his ideas in this
context was a revision of a paper presented at the University of Michigan on April 19,
1949. Id. at 156 n.1.
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distribution lies not only in lowering the costs of distribution and
obtaining informational works but also in the fact that peer-to-peer
platforms provide new means for distributing and obtaining
informational works, thus eliminating economic and technological
barriers that so far have prevented many individuals from taking an
active and effective role in the production, distribution, and
acquisition of informational works.
Peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms are, therefore, a new
emerging speech resource whose allocation, or more specifically, the
entitlement to access, use, and benefit from the prospects of this new
emerging speech resource, must be decided by society. One could
easily understand the advantages-from a freedom of speech
perspective-of an egalitarian, bottom-up regime that encourages
decentralized and democratized visions of individuals using peer-topeer platforms as their gate for communicative and creative
activities, including the reception of diversified informational works.
The important point for the present discussion is that law affects the
ability to utilize and benefit from this new, emerging speech resource,
not only through direct regulation of the ability to use it, but also
through its shadow and surrounding private law regimes, including
third party liability for copyright infringements that take place
through peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms.
As previous Parts of this Article have already shown, different
third party liability regimes influence both the architecture of peerto-peer networks and the design of software that governs the
facilitation of data and information within such networks. Thus,
distinctive designs and architectures differently affect the ability of
groups and individuals to utilize the empowering prospects of peer-topeer file-sharing platforms as a new emerging and extremely effective
speech resource.
From this perspective, broad third party liability generates
undesirable consequences, mostly because it is a catalyst toward the
enclosure of peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms and the platforms'
subordination to scrutinized gate-keeping governance. Instead of a
network of networks that communicate one with the other, society
would face zones of segregated networks, where networks for the
distribution of copyrighted materials would be governed and
controlled according to the same traditional speech hierarchy and
hegemony of corporate media. 104 Moreover, given the network

104.
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our
System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1904-11 (2000) (discussing the
existence of a "speech hierarchy" between, on one hand, media conglomerates and, on
the other hand, individuals and non-commercialized entities). Netanel convincingly
demonstrates how copyright law serves as a mechanism that leverages the hegemony
of corporate media in obtaining audience attention and shaping the tastes, preferences,
and demand for media products. Id.
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economy attributes 105 that characterize media markets and
communicative spheres, zones of segregated networks would be
expected to have direct, negative distributional consequences. Peerto-peer platforms would no longer be able to utilize and leverage their
egalitarian potential of decreasing barriers and costs for democratized
and decentralized effective speech activities by individuals (both as
speakers and as recipients of informational works). Instead, due to
their preferential ability in attracting and shaping audience
attention, 0 6 most traffic and consumer demand would be channeled
to corporate media networks, while killing softly the effective viability
of networks with alternative content.
To summarize, allocation of entitlements in speech resources
raises distributive concerns as an integral part of such processes.
Indeed, one cannot ignore the Janus-faced nature of many speech
resources as resources that are both constitutional-type goods and
proprietary-based
resources. As opposed to an egalitarian
(proclaimed) virtue of free speech, the latter attributes lean toward
processes of distribution that are based on market mechanisms. Such
mechanisms give considerable weight to reliance interests of those
who have invested resources and efforts in the production of certain
speech resources. A full and in-depth discussion of these complexities
exceeds the scope of this Article. As already mentioned in Part V,
different traditions of free speech and political philosophies would
lead to different outcomes for such tensions. Yet, regardless of the
weight that different value-based and political approaches would
deem to give to the above-mentioned distributional concerns, one

105.
Network economy, or networks effects, describe economic circumstances of
increasing return to the scale of demand. See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
424, 424-25 (1985). Elsewhere, the Author has coined and discussed the term "cultural
network effects" as referring to the fact that with regard to media products, in many
cases, the value of a media product for each individual is derived, at least partially, by
its centrality and significance for other individuals. The desirability of a media product
derives, in part, from the fact that other individuals experience it as well. A cultural
network effect relies on the fact that in many circumstances, subject to changing
conditions and variables, individuals' attention and preferences for media products are
affected and influenced by the products' popularity and consumption by others. Hence,
when speaking of effective audience attention as a precondition for a substantial, and
not just formal, execution of speech powers, the issue is not just getting the attention of
many separate individuals; the issue is getting the attention of a cluster of individuals
who, together and by their interactions, might treat someone's media product as a
desirable and unifying good. Mediated cultural competition is about gaining preference
for one's media product as social glue, which produces a hue of solidarity around it.
Guy Pessach, Copyright Law as a Silencing Restriction on Noninfringing Materials:
Unveiling the Scope of Copyright Diversity Externalities, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1085
(2003).
106.
See generally Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Discourages
Creative Output: The Overlooked Impact of Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785
(2004).
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general imperative still remains: the adjustment of private law
regimes, including copyright law and third party liability in
particular, must take into account their overall-direct and implicitdistributive implications on the ability of both individuals and groups
to access, use, and rely on new emerging speech resources such as
peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms and content that is available
through them.
At least for those who support broad and decentralized
distribution of speech resources, this is one more argument for
limiting and narrowing third party liability for peer-to-peer copyright
infringements.

VII. NEXT GENERATION QUESTIONS: ISPs' LIABILITY FOR MANAGING
PEER-TO-PEER TRAFFIC

The purpose of this Part is to apply the policy considerations that
were set forth previously to some of the next generation questions
that peer-to-peer platforms are already beginning to give rise to.
More specifically, this Part addresses the question of ISPs' liability
for their involvement in managing and facilitating copyrighted data
and other informational works as such materials are distributed
through peer-to-peer platforms. The focus will be on two technological
applications that are already being used by ISPs: routing and active
caching. Thus far, the legal aspects of these applications have not
been analyzed and discussed. The following paragraphs briefly
describe the manner in which these two applications function and
then examine the questions they raise with regard to the legal
liability of ISPs.
Several empirical studies show that data transmitted through
peer-to-peer file-sharing networks consists of approximately 60-70%
10 7
of the overall broadband bandwidth that is consumed by end-users.
This aggressive consumption of network resources by peer-to-peer
technologies attracts the attention of ISPs. It requires ISPs to come
up with solutions that provide better facilities for both controlling and
10 8
managing efficiently the traffic of data through such platforms.
For ISPs, the provision of efficient solutions to the burden that
peer-to-peer traffic imposes on their networks is a compelling need,

107.
For examples of such surveys, see CACHELOGIC, P2P IN 2005 STUDY,
http://www.cachelogic.com/home/pages/studies/2005_06.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2006);
CISCO SYS., MANAGING PEER-TO-PEER TRAFFIC WITH CISCO SERVICE CONTROL
(2005),
http://www.cisco.com/application/pdfIenIus/guest/products/ps
TECHNOLOGY
6150/c1244/cdccont_0900aecd8023500d.pdf [hereinafter Cisco Sys.].
See CISCO SYS., supra note 107, at 2-3 (commenting that ISPs have
108.
developed solutions to accommodate the increased use of peer-to-peer file-sharing
networks).
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not only because of the financial cost of aggressive bandwidth
consumption (especially in the context of transnational data
transmissions), but also because the commercial requirement to
maintain consumers' satisfaction from the surfing (and the
downloading) experience that ISPs provide. 109
Accordingly, in the last decade, several technological applications
have been developed to provide better tools for diagnosing, analyzing,
and managing peer-to-peer traffic. Such applications enable
identification of peer-to-peer traffic according to the various protocols
that different peer-to-peer file-sharing software use and then
management of the traffic of data that is transmitted through the use
of these protocols. 110 Among several applications that have been
developed, two technological solutions-routing and active-cachinggive rise to interesting and novel questions regarding the legal
liability of ISPs.
Routing applications, such as the ones provided by SandvineIntelligent Broadband Networks, "I concentrate on minimizing
bandwidth consumption by routing (directing) peer-to-peer traffic to
the least cost network path. Peer-to-peer routing solutions are a
hardware-software integrated system that operates in two stages: in
the first stage, the system tracks and retains data on the most
popular files and on previous end-users (more specifically, internet
protocol addresses) who have downloaded these files. 112 Then, at the
second stage, when another user searches a file by using file-sharing
protocol, the ISP routing solution directs this user to the nearest
other end-user who has the relevant file and thereby enables the
uploading of the requested file through the shortest and most
113
economized path.
Active Caching solutions, such as the ones provided by
CacheLogic-Advanced Solutions for P2P Networks, 114
are an

109.
See id. at 3-4 (stating that Cisco's business solutions alleviate the
challenges associated with increased bandwidth consumption and maintaining
customer satisfaction).
110.
For example, Cisco's advanced service control technology provides a
combined hardware and software solution for managing peer-to-peer traffic. Id.
111.
Sandvine Homepage, http://www.sandvine.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006);
see also Sandvine, Peer-to-Peer Element: Optimizing P2P Traffic in Your Network,
http://www.sandvine.com/products/p2p-element.asp
(last visited Nov. 17, 2006)
[hereinafter Peer-to-Peer Element] (describing the product PPE 8200).
112.
See Peer-to-Peer Element, supra note 111 (describing the process).
113.
Id.
114.
CacheLogic Homepage, http://www.cachelogic.com (last visited Nov. 17,
2006). CacheLogic describes one of its products, Cachepliance, as follows:
The Cachepliance product range has been specifically designed to reduce
transit, access and last mile traffic volumes by dramatically reducing the
amount of repetitive/duplicate P2P traffic traversing Service Provider
networks ....
The principle is simple: Cachepliance(s) are located on a Service
Provider's network and monitor P2P file transfers. If a file being transferred is
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advanced and sophisticated version of routing applications. In
addition to the above-mentioned two functions, an active caching
application does one more function: it enables the ISP to cache1 15 files
that are exchanged through peer-to-peer protocols. 116 These files are
then stored on a server based on their popularity. 117 Subsequently,
when an end-user searches a specific file, if the file exists on the
caching server, the user's request will be routed to the caching server
from which the upload stage will take place. 118 Basically, both traffic
management applications are "color blind" in the sense that they are
applied to non-infringing files that are exchanged through the
system. 119 However, given the popularity of exchanging copyrighted
materials through peer-to-peer platforms, logically such files are
expected to be most of the files that are cached and routed to by the
applications.
There is no concrete evidence regarding the scope and scale of
ISPs that are utilizing applications such as the ones described above.
This fact might not be surprising given the legal liability questions
that such applications might raise. One can still presume, however,
that given the aggressive consumption of bandwidth by peer-to-peer
applications, ISPs are bound to rely on some peer-to-peer traffic
management solutions, including those described above. As set forth
in the following paragraphs, there are also several policy
considerations that support the classification of such applications as
legal under the prism of copyright law.
From a positive law perspective, routing, on one hand, and active
caching solutions, on the other hand, raise different questions of legal
liability. Mere routing applications do not involve an act of
reproduction or copying by the ISP. 120 Therefore, mere routing
solutions do not fall under the category of actions that might give rise

already held in the cache, the connection to the P2P subscriber serving the file
is intercepted and the file is served from the cache on the Service Provider's
network. If the file being transferred is not held in the cache, the Cachepliance
allows the transfer to take place and simultaneously saves a copy of the file to
the cache. In this way it quickly builds up a library of the most popular files.
CacheLogic,
Products:
P2P-Management, http://www.cachelogic.com/home/pages/
products/cachepliance.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Products: P2PManagement].
115.
As outlined in the following paragraph, the term "cache" or "caching" is
commonly used, including by legislators, as a term for describing a temporary storage
of material on a system or network controlled or operated by or for ISPs. See, e.g., 17
U.S.C. § 512(b) (2005) (mentioning system caching). Yet in the case of active caching
solutions, such as the ones described in the main text, it is questionable whether such
actions follow the requirement of temporary storage.
116.
See, e.g., Products: P2P-Management, supra note 114 (describing process).
117.
Id.
118.

Id.

119.
120.

Id.
Id.
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to direct liability for copyright infringement by ISPs. Nevertheless,
at least according to some views, routing applications might still
expose internet providers to the risk of third party liability. One such
view is expressed in Universal Music Australia 21 by the federal court
of Australia, discussed in Part II.
Recall that according to the Australian approach, third parties
are obliged-by a statutory duty of care-to take "reasonable steps"
that would significantly decrease the use of file-sharing software for
copyright infringements. 12 2 Such steps include non-optional keyword
and metadata filtering, which would prevent the display of search
results with files whose particulars (title, artist, etc.) matched
particulars of copyrighted sound recordings (such that are listed in
the catalogues of record companies). 123 When one applies this
standard of care to routing applications, it seems that at least
according to the Australian approach ISPs that use routing
applications for managing peer-to-peer traffic are obliged to adjust
these applications in ways that would block and filter the trafficking
of copyrighted materials. As this Part will argue, this outcome is
undesirable, yet it also seems an unavoidable conclusion according to
Universal Music Australia. Routing solutions such as those
previously described are being implemented and used by ISPs
precisely because of their abilities to scrutinize files' traffic through
peer-to-peer platforms and then route requests for files to the nearest
other end-user who has already obtained the requested file. 124 Yet the
same applications could likewise be used to block or filter files
identified by their name or metadata as files that contain copyrighted
materials. Once again, there are far-reaching potential implications of
the Australian approach regarding third party liability.
Active caching solutions are even more hazardous for ISPs.
Basically, caching solutions, as they are implemented by ISPs,
involve reproduction and copying of files, including those that contain
copyrighted materials, into the cached files. 125 Hence, absent a
statutory exemption, such copying would expose ISPs to the risk of
copyright infringement claims. Both the United States' and the
European Community's copyright legislation includes specific
exemptions from liability to copyright infringement with regard to the

121.
Universal Music Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (2005)
220 A.L.R. 1, 88.
122.
Id. at 5.
123.
See, e.g., Peer-to-Peer Element, supra note 111 (describing the routing
product PPE 8200).
124.
See, e.g., Products: P2P-Management, supra note 114 (describing process
for the product Cachepliance).
125.
See, e.g., SANDVINE, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF TODAY'S EVASIVE P2P
TRAFFIC: SERVICE PROVIDER STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING P2P FILESHARING 6-7 (2004),

http://www.sandvine.com/products/p2p-element.asp (follow "Whitepaper" hyperlink)
(describing risks associated with utilizing network caching).

126

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40.:87

caching of copyrighted materials by ISPs. 1 26 Indeed, these exemptions
were legislated before the phenomenon of peer-to-peer file-sharing
had emerged. 127 One could also speculate whether these exemptions
were intended to cover circumstances other than the caching of
content from websites that were voluntarily made accessible to the
public by their owners. Nevertheless, this current legislative
framework still justifies further analysis, both at the formal level and
regarding the policy question of whether exempting ISPs from legal
liability in this context is indeed desirable.
Section 512(b) of the United States' DMCA 128 states that an ISP
shall not be liable for infringement of copyright by reason of the
intermediate and temporary storage of material on a system or
network controlled or operated by or for the service provider. To fall
under the exemption, the ISP must comply with three main
conditions: (1) the copyrighted material must have been made
available online by a person other than the service provider; (2) the
copyrighted material must have been transmitted by that person
through the system or network to another person; and (3) the storage
must have been carried out through an automatic technical process
for the purpose of making the material available to users of the
system or network who, after the material was transmitted, had
requested access to the material from the person who had made it
available. 129 Section 512(b)'s exemption is further conditioned upon
the obligation of the ISP to remove from the cache server any
material that was claimed to be infringing material, 130 as well as an

See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(b) (2004) (stating
126.
United States exemption); Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 22, at art. 13
(stating European Community's exemptions).
127.
Compare § 512 (showing that amendment was added in 1998) with MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005) (discussing
peer-to-peer file-sharing for the first time).
128.
See § 512(b).
129.
In addition, to fall under the caching exemption, Section 512(b) requires
that the ISP comply with rules concerning the refreshing, reloading, or other updating
of the copyrighted material that were "specified by the person that made the material
available online," as long as such rules are in accordance with a "generally accepted
industry standard data communications protocol for the system or network through
which that person makes the material available," and the material was not used by
that person to "prevent or unreasonably impair the intermediate storage to which this
subsection applies." § 512(b)(2)(B).
130.
More specifically, Section 512(b)(2)(E) states that:
[lf the person described in paragraph (1)(A) makes that material available
online without the authorization of the copyright owner of the material, the
service provider responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material that is claimed to be infringing upon notification of claimed
infringement as described in subsection (c)(3), except that this subparagraph
applies only if (i) the material has previously been removed from the
originating site or access to it has been disabled, or a court has ordered that the
material be removed from the originating site or that access to the material on
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obligation to condition access to the cached materials upon the terms,
conditions, and fees that were imposed by the provider of such
131
materials.
Similar provisions are also included in the law of the European
Community. Article 13 of the European Directive on Electronic
Commerce, 132 entitled "Caching," determines that an ISP shall not be
liable for the automatic, intermediate, and temporary storage of that
information, performed for the sole purpose of making more efficient
the information's onward transmission to other recipients of the
service upon their request, on condition that: (1) the provider does not
modify the information; (2) the provider complies with conditions on
access to the information; (3) the provider complies with rules
regarding the updating of the information, specified in a manner
widely recognized and used by the industry; (4) the provider does not
interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely recognized and
used by the industry, to obtain data on the use of the information;
and (5) the provider acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to
the information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge that
the information at the initial source of the transmission has been
removed from the network, that access to it has been disabled, or that
a court or an administrative authority has ordered such removal or
disablement. 133 A related law is Article 5 of the Copyright in the
Information Society Directive, 134 which exempts from liability for
copyright infringement temporary acts of reproduction which are
transient or incidental and an integral and essential part of a
technological process whose sole purpose is to enable: (1) a
transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary,
or (2) a lawful use of a work or other subject matter to be made, with
135
no independent economic significance.
A close reading of the caching exemptions in the United States
and the European Community reveals that the "content provision"
model, which was before both legislatures, was mainly a model of
unilateral top-down provision of content through publicized websites,

the originating site be disabled; and (ii) the party giving the notification
includes in the notification a statement confirming that the material has been
removed from the originating site or access to it has been disabled or that a
court has ordered that the material be removed from the originating site or
that access to the material on the originating site be disabled.
§ 512(b)(2)(E). Section 512(c)(3) outlines the requirements of notification according to
which an ISP is obliged to remove material that is proclaimed to be infringing material.
§ 512(c)(3).
131.
§ 512(b)(2)(D).
132.
Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 22, at art. 13.
133.
Id.
134.
Copyright Directive, supra note 83, at art. 5 (outlining the harmonization of
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society).
135.
Id.
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rather than the diffused and decentralized end-to-end model of peerto-peer platforms. Given this background, one can see that all current
caching exemptions focus on a prohibition of caching content already
identified as infringing and therefore removed from its originating
location on the web-a requirement that seems totally ineffective and
maybe even irrelevant in the context of file-sharing through diffused
peer-to-peer platforms. Nevertheless, the literal text of both
exemptions is still such that they might be applicable in the context
of peer-to-peer active caching solutions. Questions like whether active
peer-to-peer caching should be classified as an act that fulfills the
requirement of "intermediate and temporary storage" are interpretive
questions that could be approached from different directions,
including one that would support broad application of current caching
exemptions. Although the Author does not pretend to offer a
scrutinized inspection of each and every condition within current
caching exemptions and their applicability in the context of peer-topeer active caching, he does put forward the following argument.
If courts would take into account the policy considerations that
were set forth in previous Parts of this Article, they would liberally
and broadly interpret and apply current caching exemptions,
including in the context of active caching applications for managing
peer-to-peer traffic. The same considerations also support a
conclusion that mere routing applications should not expose ISPs to
the risk of third party liability, even if such applications are
commonly used to redirect users that are seeking and attempting to
download files with copyrighted materials.
This last argument requires further explanation. Overall, there
is wide consensus regarding the efficiency of caching mechanisms and
their contribution in facilitating and improving consumption and
management of network resources. 136 Traditional caching
mechanisms, however, have relied profoundly on two assumptions.
The first assumption is that in most cases, there is at least an implied
consent of web sites for identical caching of their webpages, mostly
because many web sites that are accessible to the general public
benefit from increased audience attention to their content. In this
context, caching functions as a mere mirror of the originating website.
The second assumption is that if and when infringing materials are
identified, the main issue at stake would be removing them from
their originating website and, only then, a consequent updating and
identical removal from the cached materials.
Neither presumption seems valid in the context of active caching
that supports and manages peer-to-peer file-sharing. The first
presumption, the implied consent of copyright owners, is inapplicable

136.
See, e.g., SANDVINE, supra note 125, at 6-7 (describing risks associated with
utilizing network caching).
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because in most cases, files that are exchanged through peer-to-peer
platforms do not originate from publicized web sites that are open to
the general public. 137 Likewise, the second assumption is not
applicable because peer-to-peer platforms do not have one central
node-the web site-from which the infringing content is taken;
rather, within peer-to-peer platforms, the same content could be
accessible-and therefore it could be cached from-many different
end-users. This fact makes almost obsolete the requirement that
infringing materials removed from originating websites, would have
to be removed from their cached mirrors. Realistically, active-caching
applications cache files that individuals download by using file138
sharing protocols and not files that are statically located elsewhere.
These observations seemingly cut against a broad exemption for
active caching, at least whenever ISPs are provided by copyright
owners with lists of files that consist of infringing materials. One
might also argue that such an interpretation should be applied to
existing statutory caching exemptions in order to adjust them to the
new technological and communicative characteristics of an end-to-end
networked environment. Such an approach also has parallels with the
paradigm that guided the Australian court in Universal Music
Australia.
But, on the other hand, there are several policy considerations
that might support a more liberal and flexible approach to
legitimizing active caching of peer-to-peer file-sharing: active caching
applications could be conceived as an integral module of peer-to-peer
file-sharing platforms, but instead of being part of the software, such
applications are components that are added by ISPs who control and
manage broadband bandwidth and other network resources of the
physical layer. Under this view, there seems to be no justification to
subject ISPs and active caching applications to legal liability that is
broader than the legal liability that producers and distributors of filesharing software are subject to. From this standpoint, active caching
solutions are basically just a "patch" that improves the efficiency and
data transmission capabilities of peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms.
Hence, the same legal regime that applies to file-sharing software
should apply with regard to this additional patch also, and as this
Article has shown, there are several arguments in support of
narrowing and limiting the legal liability, including that of third

137.
Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 862-63 (20032004) (explaining peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms).
138.
Id.: see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of
Internet Service Providers for Peer-to-PeerTraffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y, 16,
37-41 (2006) (demonstrating the bounded limits of the DMCA, as technological specific
legislation, to regulate later technological developments, such as peer-to-peer filesharing platforms).
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parties, for copyright infringements that occur through peer-to-peer
file-sharing platforms.
More specifically, imposing legal liability on ISPs with regard to
active caching applications is bound to have significant chilling and
deterrence effects on actions ISPs take in facilitating and managing
peer-to-peer traffic. Assuming that all ISPs would be exposed to the
same degree of legal risk, any limitation on their ability to implement
active caching solutions would tend to affect all ISPs similarly. The
expected outcome would be the imposition of a legal restraint that
prevents ISPs from competing over the efficiency of using their
network resources for file-sharing activities. Active caching solutions
would no longer be applied, and due to legal barriers regarding their
implementation, ISPs would no longer have to compete over the
efficiency of their data transmission in this context.
Overall, the main disadvantage that such a scenario creates is
the transformation of peer-to-peer platforms into an inferior and
disadvantaged speech resources. Imposing legal obstacles on the
ability of ISPs to use active caching solutions would drive peer-to-peer
platforms into being a second-rate speech resource. Peer-to-peer
platforms would face difficulties in competing with other, more
established speech resources, many of them already controlled by
corporate media.
Hence, from a standpoint the emphasizes broad, decentralized,
and democratized distribution of speech resources among society's
individuals, there is a strong institutional argument for legitimizing
active caching applications. Such mechanisms appear to be crucial for
the long-term development and viability of peer-to-peer platforms as
alternate speech resources with all the distributive and social
139
advantages they encompass.
Moreover, one cannot ignore the fact that one unavoidable
outcome from prohibiting and limiting active caching applications
could be a strong inclination toward the commercialization and
enclosure of advanced peer-to-peer platforms-those that would be
legally able to apply active caching solutions. In a manner similar to
the one described in Part VI supra, subordinating active caching to
the exclusive rights of copyright owners could be a catalyst toward an
architecture of segregated networks in which the dominant networks
140
are those for the distribution of popular copyrighted materials.
These networks are expected to be governed and controlled according
to the same traditional speech hierarchy and hegemony of corporate
media, while other alternative networks would be set aside. Indeed,
the approach proposed here has its costs: legalizing active caching
applications increases the risk of copyright infringements through

139.
140.

See supra Part VI.
See Elkin-Koren, supra note 138, at 68-70.

20071

PEER-TO-PEER FILE-SHARING

peer-to-peer platforms. Nevertheless, on the whole this cost might be
justified, at least from a perspective that emphasizes the social
benefits of peer-to-peer platforms as a new emerging speech resource
with strong distributive advantages.
Thus far, courts have not had an opportunity to decide the
legality of active caching applications. There is, however, one
important decision of the Canadian Supreme Court that might
support the approach described above. In SOCAN, 14 1 among other
issues, the Canadian Supreme Court was asked to decide the legality
of music-files' caching by ISPs. 14 2 Although the decision has no direct
reference to or discussion of circumstances of peer-to-peer file14 3
sharing, it is still a decision with several important points.
Prior to the supreme court's decision, the Canadian federal court
had held that if an ISP creates a cache of copyrighted materials, even
for purely technical reasons, liability for copyright infringement could
be imposed on the ISP.144 The supreme court overruled the decision
and explicitly protected the ability of ISPs to deploy innovative
technologies, such as caching, that improve the internet's
efficiency. 14 5 More specifically, ISPs were privileged from liability for
copyright infringement under Section 2.4(1)(b) of the Canadian
Copyright Act, which exempts from liability a "person whose only act
in respect of the communication of a work or other subject-matter to
the public consists of providing the means of telecommunication
necessary for another person to so communicate the work or other
146
subject-matter.
In reaching its decision, the supreme court emphasized the
"public interest in encouraging intermediaries
who make
telecommunications possible to expand and improve their operations
without the threat of copyright infringement." 14 7 The court added
that "to impose copyright liability on intermediaries would obviously

141.
Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Can. Ass'n of
Internet Providers, [20041 2 S.C.R. 427.
142.
Id. at 431.
143.
Moreover, the factual merits of the case are unique because rather than
dealing with the question of liability for caching as unauthorized reproduction, the
issue was whether ISPs should be regarded as "communicating the copyrighted work to
the public" and therefore according to Section 2.4(1)(b) of the Canadian Copyright Act,
should be obliged to pay statutory royalties to collecting societies of authors and
creators. Id. at 468, 472-73.
144.
145.

Id. at 448.
Id. at 472-73.

146.
Id. at 444, 478. The Section 2.4(1)(b) exemption applies only with regard to
the right of communicating a copyrighted work to the public. Yet, as already
mentioned in supra note 143, this was the sole framework of discussion within the
court's decision. Although there was no reference to or discussion of the compliance of
caching practices with the exclusive right of reproduction, the court did cite caching
exemptions from other countries-the United States and the European Communitythat refer to the right of reproduction. See 2 S.C.R. at 458-59.
147.
See id. at 430.
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chill that expansion and development" and that "the creation of a
'cache' copy, after all, is a serendipitous consequence of improvements
in Internet technology, is content neutral, and . . . ought not to have
any legal bearing on the communication between the content provider
and the end user. '' 148 "Caching" the court added, "is dictated by the
need to deliver faster and more economic service, and should not,
when undertaken only for such technical reasons, attract copyright
149
liability."
SOCAN could, therefore, represent an approach that weighs and
takes into account some of the central considerations that support a
liberal and flexible approach toward caching applications. One could
only hope, therefore, that this approach will be adopted in cases that
deal directly with active caching applications that are implemented in
150
the context of peer-to-peer file-sharing.

VIII. SUMMARY
Throughout this critical-comparative analysis, this Article has
shown the distinct paradigms and standards of third party liability
that different legal systems-including the U.S., Australian, and
Canadian systems-have adopted and implemented thus far in the
context of peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms. In addition, the Article
has presented several novel insights regarding the policy
considerations that should guide courts and legislatures when dealing
with third party liability for copyright infringements that occur
through peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms. In this context, the
Article has added three arguments in support of narrowing and
limiting the liability of third parties.
The first argument has focused on the normative imperative for
a requirement of compliance between legal liability of third parties
and copyright law's exemptions and limitations regime. According to

148.
Id. at 472-73.
149.
Id. at 473.
150.
It is worth noting, however, that after SOCAN was decided in June 2005,
the Canadian government introduced Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act,
1st Sess., 38th Parliament, 53-54 Elizabeth II (2004-2005), available at
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?pub=bill&doc=C-60&parl=
38&ses=1&language=E&File=24, which among other issues, includes new statutory
provisions regarding caching and related matters. Section 31.1 of the bill determined
that providers of network services do not infringe copyright solely by providing the
technology that enables the telecommunication or reproduction of a work. Id. § 31.1.
Section 31.1(2) adds that caching is also covered by this immunity provision. To qualify
for the caching provision, however, network providers must meet three conditions: (a)
they do not modify the content; (b) they respect any limitations established by the
person who posted the content; and (c) they do not interfere with lawful access to usage
data related to it. Overall, this proposal parallels current U.S. and European
Community caching exemptions that have previously been described. Id. § 31.1(2).
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the second argument, positive externalities and spillovers that peerto-peer platforms tend to generate further support a legal regime that
places a higher degree of risk on the proprietary interests of copyright
owners. Lastly, the Article has introduced the notion of peer-to-peer
file-sharing platforms as a new emerging speech resource that society
has to decide how to allocate. The Article has shown that once aware
of this aspect of peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms, the case for
narrowing and limiting the legal liability of third parties becomes
even stronger. The contribution and normative significance of the
above-mentioned framework was then exemplified in the contexts of
active caching and routing applications that ISPs use for efficient
management of peer-to-peer traffic. As Part VII observed, there are
several convincing arguments in support of limiting the liability of
ISPs that use such applications, even if they involve reproduction and
copying of copyrighted files that are exchanged through peer-to-peer
file-sharing platforms.

